india china relations essay 2020

A big-picture look at the India-China relationship

• Full Transcript

Subscribe to the Center for Asia Policy Studies Bulletin

Vijay gokhale , vijay gokhale nonresident senior fellow - carnegie india, foreign secretary of india (2018-20) shivshankar menon , and shivshankar menon distinguished fellow - centre for social and economic progress, former national security advisor - government of india, foreign secretary of india (2006-09) tanvi madan tanvi madan senior fellow - foreign policy , center for asia policy studies.

September 20, 2023

• 46 min read

On the inaugural episode of Global India , host Tanvi Madan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, speaks with two former Indian ambassadors to Beijing on Indian perceptions of China and New Delhi’s strategy toward its largest neighbor. Ambassador Vijay Gokhale and Ambassador Shivshankar Menon share their views on India-China competition, the potential for cooperation or crisis, and what it means for India’s partners.

• Listen to Global India on Apple ,  Spotify , and  wherever  you listen to podcasts.
• Watch on YouTube .
• Learn about other Brookings podcasts from the  Brookings Podcast Network .

03:24 The state of India-China relations 20 years ago

07:27 The relationship since 2008

11:45 The uneasy state of India-China ties today

14:17 What the India-China border dispute is about

18:23 Spring 2020 border clashes

23:34 Is India moving the goalposts on the border agreements?

27:32 A shift in Indian public opinion on China across the board

29:06 China’s changed posture on India’s periphery

32:52 Do India and China have a similar vision of the Indo-Pacific region?

35:26 What are the areas where India and China are still cooperating?

38:50 Four trends evident in India’s recent approach to China

41:05 Should India deepen ties with the U.S., or hold back?

43:03 India deepening ties across the region

46:31 What would détente between India and China require

49:20 What is the chance of crisis escalation between India and China?

51:26 Areas of potential competition and cooperation in the coming years?

54:11 Lightning Round: What is the biggest myth about India-China relations?

MADAN: Welcome to Global India , I’m Tanvi Madan a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, where I specialize in Indian foreign policy. In this new Brookings podcast, I’ll be turning the spotlight on India’s partnerships, its rivalries, and its role on the global stage. This season our conversations will be focused on India’s relationship with China, and why and how China-India ties are shaping New Delhi’s view of the world.

The reason this inaugural season is focusing on India’s relationship with China is because these days that is the prism through which policymakers in New Delhi often see and assess other countries and other issues. China is India’s largest neighbor; it is also India’s second largest trading partner. But it is also at the same time India’s primary external rival, one with whom India fought a war in 1962.

Those tensions have re-emerged in recent years, and they have significantly affected almost every aspect of Indian foreign policy. Moreover, what happens between India and China won’t just affect the two countries, but the region and arguably the whole world.

Our first episode will take a big picture look at the relationship between India and China. My guests are two former senior Indian officials, both of whom are China hands. Ambassador Shivshankar Menon is a distinguished fellow at the Center for Social and Economic Progress in New Delhi. He was India’s national security adviser from 2010 to 2014. Before that he served as foreign secretary—that is, the senior most bureaucratic position in India’s Foreign Ministry. He was also India’s ambassador to China between 2000 to 2003.

We’re also joined by another former ambassador to China, Ambassador Vijay Gokhale, who led India’s mission in Beijing between 2016 and 2017. Following that he served as Indian foreign secretary from 2018 to 2020. Now he is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie India.

Both my guests are prolific writers and have authored several books that are worth reading. We link to their bios in the episode notes. Here I’ll mention Vijay Gokhale’s book The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India , and Shivshankar Menon’s Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy .

In this conversation recorded before the G-20 Summit as well as before the BRICS Summit, the two former officials explained where the India-China relationship stood 15 years ago, where it stands today, and what changed. My guests also discussed the concerns that India has about China and New Delhi’s strategy for dealing with that country. Our conversation also covered the prospects for a Indian-China rapprochement or cooperation, or for that matter crisis escalation.

And of course, we talked about implications of relations between these two Asian giants for other countries, particularly the United States.

Welcome to the Global India podcast, Ambassador Shivshankar Menon.

MENON: Thank you. Thanks for having me.

MADAN: Ambassador Vijay Gokhale, welcome to this inaugural episode as well.

GOKHALE: Thank you, Tanvi.

3:24 The state of India-China relations 20 years ago

MADAN: I want to start this conversation by taking us a few years back, not as far back as the ‘40s, ‘50s, or ‘60s, but about 15, 20 years back. If we had been having this conversation, Ambassador Menon, starting with you, just in in brief, how would you have described 15, 20 years ago the state of India-China relations?

MENON: Well, about 15 years ago is when we first started seeing signs of trouble in the relationship. We had a modus vivendi, which had been worked out through the ‘80s between the two countries of how to handle our differences and how to keep peace on the border, which was formalized during the [Prime Minister] Rajiv Gandhi visit in 1988, which was fairly simple. It was that we will settle all our differences peacefully. We’ll negotiate them. But while we are negotiating them, we will also cooperate where we can, both bilaterally and on the international stage, and that we would maintain the status quo on the boundary, as it were, on the border. That was formalized in an agreement, Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement , in ‘93.

But this started fraying, I would say, by about 2008, 2009, when we first started seeing incidents on the border of the Chinese troops changing their behavior, trying to extend roads, stay on what we considered our side of the Line of Actual Control and so on.

And when other issues in the bilateral relationship also started coming up.

China’s behavior in the neighborhood, in South Asia, also changed. There was much more willingness to get involved in local politics in India’s other neighbors, in Nepal and Sri Lanka and so on.

So, I think the first signs of difficulty were really around 15 years ago. And that’s exactly when India started taking what we regarded as countermeasures. We raised two mountain divisions in 2010, 2013, raised a mountain strike corps, started opening up advance landing grounds.

There’s a larger political context as well. The India-U.S. civil nuclear agreement had been signed in 2008; the defense and other relationships with the U.S. were booming; and China’s relationship with the U.S. was steadily deteriorating. I think it was still an open question. But we started seeing various signs of friction. The Chinese started objecting to our drilling for oil in the South China Sea, for instance, and Vietnamese concessions. And lots of little signs.

So, I would say that, 15 years ago, it would have been a mixed picture and one would have said, yes, there are signs of trouble, but perhaps we can handle them. We’ve handled these before and let’s see. We’d have been much more optimistic than we are today, I think. I don’t know if Vijay would agree with that.

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale, 15 years ago and also, for both of you 20 years ago, if I’d asked you how you would have described it, Ambassador Gokhale?

GOKHALE: Yeah, thank you, Tanvi. I broadly agree with what Ambassador Menon has said. And just to add to that, if I were to describe the relationship 15 to 20 years ago, I’d use the words stable, neutral. Because we weren’t friends, but we weren’t adversaries either. But it was a relationship lacking in trust. There was a trust deficit. Otherwise, broadly, I think Ambassador Menon has already outlined that the slide had begun after 2006 and 2007 and already the strains were showing in that relationship.

MADAN: I want to pick up on this idea of and dig down a little bit deeper into this 2006 to 2008 period that both of you mentioned. Ambassador Menon, you mentioned a few of them, but what were you seeing in that period in this 2006 to 2008 period, where you saw the change, what were the signs then?

MENON: Frankly, much of what we now regard as more assertive Chinese behavior, whether in the South China Sea, with Taiwan, in the Senkakus, Diaoyu, East China Sea with Japan, on the India-China border—much of that began in that period in Hu Jintao’s second term as it were.

And there are different explanations for this. One, of course, is that China realized that her relationship with the U.S. was no longer going to be as smooth as it had been before. But there’s a chicken-and-egg problem here—which came first, it’s hard to explain.

I tend towards internal domestic explanations for Chinese external behavior. It’s just what I find. I think the succession struggle to Hu Jintao had already started and ultimately culminated in Bo Xilai, the whole Bo Xilai crisis. And this is a period where I think Xi Jinping became chairman of the committee which was handling South China Sea. And if you look at it, I think this more assertive, nationalistic Chinese posture abroad, across the board, on the entire periphery—it seems to me that the India-China border and the relationship with India became part of that, became caught up in a larger thing.

By about 2015, 2016, Chinese scholars and even officials sometimes started saying that India is no longer neutral or no longer nonaligned, implying that we’d gone over to the dark side, to the U.S. And by then I think China-U.S. relations became a dominant prism through which they looked at almost everything around them.

In fact, that’s still a problem. I believe that India-China relations are sui generis ; they have their own logic, their own reasons. But so long as China looks at it purely as in terms of its great power relationships, whether with the U.S. now or previously with the Soviet Union, there’s been trouble in the relationship.

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale, what was your sense of what was both going on during this 2006 to 2008 period? And also similarly, what were the explanations you looked to? Was it domestic? Was it the relationship that China was having with the U.S.? Was it the global financial crisis as well and how various countries fared?

GOKHALE: Well, many of the reasons have already been outlined by Ambassador Menon. I just have one additional point to make. This was the ten years between 2000 and 2010 that the economic gap between India and China widened all of a sudden. In the year 2000, the ratio in terms of GDP was 1 to 2. India’s GDP was around half a trillion dollars. China’s was just over 1.2 trillion. But by the end of 2009, the end of the decade, India’s GDP was still around 1.2 or 1.3 trillion, and China’s GDP had crossed 6 or 7 trillion by then.

So, I think that the economic differential, the military differential that had emerged, as well as the diplomatic differential that emerged—because China became much more assertive on the global stage—perhaps led them to feel that they need not remain sensitive to India’s interests or concerns.

But I agree with Ambassador Menon that the Indo-U.S. relationship, the domestic situation within China politically speaking, and the sense that China had arrived on the world stage during the global financial crisis were all factors that influenced their perception of India.

MADAN: I’m going to fast forward a little bit to the present day from that period 15 years ago and ask you, Ambassador Gokhale, I’ll start with you this time, how would you describe the state of India-China ties today? And then in the next round we’ll dig a little bit deeper into why we got here and what happened between 2008 and today. But how would you describe the relationship between India and China today?

GOKHALE: So again, Tanvi, if I were to use a few words, I’d say the relationship is shaky. I’d say that there is a negative bias in the relationship now, and I would certainly feel that there is a deepening of mutual suspicion. And as a result, the India-China relationship is fraught with tension and uncertainty, which was not the case even 15 years ago.

MENON: I would agree with what Vijay just said, that it is a difficult relationship. And it’s because there is a disjuncture in the relationship. Politically, it’s at an impasse after what happened on the border in 2020 spring , with the PLA trying to change facts on the ground and not reverting to the status quo as it was before April 2020—despite 18, I think, rounds of talks between the corps commanders and so on. So, there is a political impasse.

But economically, the relationship still seems to be booming, if you look at the trade figures and so on. And there is a structural interdependence economically. Last I saw something like 28% of the value add in Indian exports is of Chinese origin, which, you know, suggests to you that both economies are really tied to each other, with the Indian economy much more dependent perhaps than the Chinese on the Indian.

And this kind of disjuncture makes for a very uneasy relationship. It’s not a good basis, quite apart from the differential in power which Vijay mentioned. And therefore, the unpredictability of the relationship. I think it’s more than just a question of stabilizing it. It’s a question of how do you address these elements of uncertainty in a relationship which you had managed. You might not have settled the issues or made tremendous progress, but you had managed for a considerable period of time. But that seems to be in jeopardy today. So, I would agree entirely with what Vijay said.

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale, we’ve heard the border mentioned a few times. For the audience who is not too familiar, what does the border dispute between China and India entail?

GOKHALE: Well, the Chinese argument is that the boundary between India and China was never historically delineated. In other words, even preceding governments, governments preceding the current regimes, had not bilaterally agreed to the boundary alignment. And, therefore, there was a traditional and customary line, and the two countries differ in where that traditional and customary line lies on the ground.

Now, that is, of course, not the Indian position. India’s position is that in all sectors there is a traditional and customary line, of course, but it has also been sanctified through treaty and through convention and practice. And that it is now a matter of the current governments, or the current states—the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India—simply committing to paper and on the ground in terms of boundary pillars, a boundary which they have already known for at least a century.

But I just want to add that the boundary question, of course, in my mind is symptomatic of a larger problem in India-China relations based on the differences in approach that both sides adopted after we became independent and the People’s Republic of China was established. They tended to see everything in the triangular competition between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, as Ambassador Menon spoke of a short while ago.

Whereas in our case, whether the relationship was healthy or not, we have always placed China in an important position in our foreign policy. And therefore, as Ambassador Menon said, India-China relations are sui generis . And I think that difference of approach is reflected in a series of problems that have arisen in the relationship over the past 70-odd years.

MADAN: And just following up on that, I want to deep dive a little bit into what happened a few years ago, what brought us from stable to shaky, as Ambassador Gokhale put it. One of the things that struck me in 2020 when there was a border crisis, a standoff, is that all of those of you who have been China hands for several years within the Indian government, all of you to a person, noted that this was a different border crisis or standoff than the previous ones, the recent previous ones have been. I want to get into why, but before I get to 2020 and the border standoff, were there border standoffs before 2020 and in that 2008 to 2019 period, say? Ambassador Menon?

MENON: Yes, there have been. In fact, there’s been a sort of gradually escalating series of crises. In 2013, the Chinese tried to come in and stay permanently in Depsang in the extreme north of the western sector. But then India took certain actions and they withdrew within three weeks. And then after that, there were other attempts by China to change the status quo across the Line [of Actual Control]. Some of them were met successfully. Some they came in, stayed for three weeks in September 2014, when Xi Jinping was visiting, and then withdrew.

I think the biggest face off, of course, was in Doklam in 2017 when the Chinese came to what we and the Bhutanese regard as Bhutanese territory. And Indian troops then confronted them. And finally, both sides withdrew.

Spring 2020, though, was different in a fundamental way. For the first time, the Chinese tried to change the status quo in several places along the line in their favor, and to stay permanently on what we considered our side of the line in places that they had never been before, and to prevent us from patrolling areas which we had traditionally patrolled. And they did this simultaneously along the line in several places, which suggests a level of coordination, planning, and high-level approval, which had not been the case in previous such incidents. I’m sure they all involved high-level approvals in the Chinese system because the PLA is a political instrument primarily and the party does control the PLA all the time.

But I think this attempt to escalate probably came from a sense of military superiority in the sense that deterrence had clearly broken down, because we’re talking here about effective deterrence on the line.

But also, I think from a larger strategic sense—because there have to be larger strategic or political goals to justify something like that—basically going against the various agreements which they had respected in the past but tearing them up and changing the status quo. And so, one has to look for larger reasons for this.

It wasn’t entirely a surprise. Some of us have been warning about escalating Chinese changed behavior. But I think the scope and scale of it and the sheer brazenness of it was I think is why you saw that unanimous reaction across the board from not just those who had been involved, but even others.

And since then, actually, the situation hasn’t yet been stabilized or addressed. I mean, the root causes of this we still have to establish. We haven’t gone through the sort of detailed political reckoning on both sides and understanding—or agreed on a set of measures to prevent this happening again. In fact, the Chinese attitude seems to be, oh, you know, that’s over now, let’s put that behind us and let’s move on. Which leaves the possibility of it happening again open, and suggests that from the Chinese side, they might be quite happy to maintain this threat. Whereas India’s stand has been that we need to address these issues and restore the status quo if we are to have a normal political relationship. We can’t just ignore what’s happened.

My own preference would be that that we actually start a real strategic dialogue with the Chinese and begin with the simple things, with which CBMs [confidence-building measures] still work, which don’t work, crisis management measures, simple things on the ground. I’m not saying that these will restore trust. No. Because we have such a long history on that border. But you at least want the confidence that you can manage the situation, that you can stabilize it to start with, and then see whether you can actually build a relationship. But today, it’s still very hard to see.

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale, how would you describe what happened in 2020 and why you felt that it was different from the previous crises or an inflection point? You’ve said elsewhere that it’s led to India and China going from peaceful coexistence to armed co-existence. What made 2020 different and what exactly happened at the boundary?

GOKHALE: Well, the 2020 incident was, as Ambassador Menon said, in the wake of a number of earlier incidents that had happened. And during those incidents, the framework that had been built by the two countries after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit gradually disintegrated. And therefore, when the developments happened in 2020 at multiple points along the LAC, it resulted in the first fatalities that we have had on the boundary or on the Line of Actual Control in perhaps 45-odd years.

Now, the Galwan incident and the other incidents are significant not only because of those fatalities, but because the situation along the boundary has fundamentally changed. In other words, there is enhanced activity in terms of military deployments, but there is also enhanced infrastructure building. And my sense is that even if we want to return to the status quo ante of 2019, it may not be possible to do so now, both because of the infrastructure built by both sides and because of the deployment of troops, which unless the trust deficit is bridged, will be difficult to reduce in any significant number.

MADAN: Ambassador Menon, you mentioned the agreements. One thing sometimes you hear from Chinese analysts is they say that India has changed the goalposts. Because we’ve heard the government of India say that the situation at the border has been disturbed, and that the broader relationship between India and China cannot return to normal, or return to what it was, as long as the border remains not normal and as long as peace and tranquility hasn’t been maintained at the border. You have Chinese analysts saying this is changing the goalposts and that India is now asking for the border dispute to be resolved. Is that how you see it or what did the agreement say? Because India is saying this is a violation of the agreements and the Chinese are saying that India has now changed the goalposts. What is your assessment of what exactly is the violation of agreements that India sees? And is it China that has a different impression of what India is asking for?

MENON: I think you’ll notice that this is said by analysts, not by the Chinese government, because the Chinese government committed itself in writing and in an international legal treaty in 1993 and 1996 and thereafter, several times, to maintaining the status quo on the border, not changing the situation on the ground, and to resolving any issues that might arise peacefully. Instead, we had people dying on the border for the first time in 45 years by adversary action in 2020 spring. So, if anyone has shifted the goalposts or their understanding, I think it’s Chinese analysts. It’s the analysts who are saying this.

Now, this is not new, frankly, in our experience. When you go back, what China has said about a boundary settlement has varied over time. From saying we will do a package settlement, we will be reasonable, we will recognize the present situation in the eastern sector if you accept what we’ve done in the west and so on to now they say no, there’s no question, India must first make concessions. 1985 they started specifying which areas they wanted, including Tawang and so on.

So, I mean, China has, depending on her perception of the relative balance of power on the border, has, I think, negotiated and adjusted her stand accordingly. And frankly, she doesn’t understand, I think, that not everybody else operates quite the same way the Chinese do. I think they project on others what they do. After all, they were as good as loyal allies of the U.S. until the global financial crisis, as long as they believed that was the balance of power that existed. Once they thought their moment had come with the global financial crisis, they changed their behavior. And that’s what we were talking about after 2008.

So, it’s a bit disingenuous for Chinese analysts to say that India’s shifted the goalposts. India has always maintained that peace and tranquility on the border is essential if the relationship is to be normal and is to progress. We’re a democracy—people are not going to understand this, that you can have a live border with the threat of Indians dying on that border and of the border being disturbed or India losing territory to a neighbor, and still expect life to go on as usual with that neighbor.

Frankly, I haven’t heard a good explanation from the Chinese side for why they did what they did in 2020. I think this is part of the problem. And therefore, you hear arguments like this.

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale, what is your sense—even if it’s a few different explanations that you have—for why China did what it did, as Ambassador Menon put it?

GOKHALE: Well, I think, Tanvi, that they seem to have concluded that either India did not have the capacity for geopolitical backlash or lacked the political will to do so. All the reasons that Ambassador Menon outlined perhaps fed into that view in the Chinese strategic establishment.

And perhaps there was some kind of a strategic miscalculation there, because the subsequent response which came across from the Indian side in all the stratas of society—and I think Ambassador Menon mentioned that across the board this was condemned—suggests that there is a new paradigm in which Indians are looking at India-China relations.

Now, of course, whether the Chinese get that or not is something I am not clear about because I haven’t spoken to any of them over the last few months. But I presume that if the Chinese embassy is actually following developments in India, it should be fairly clear to them that even those who were willing to give the benefit of doubt to the Chinese side, today are no longer willing to give them the benefit of the doubt.

So, there has been a shift in Indian public opinion across the board: governments, strategic community, media, even business. And I think that is going to impact on the future of the relationship.

MADAN: I want to come back to the future in a few minutes. But I do want to also talk about [what] we mentioned, the boundary. Ambassador Menon, if tomorrow the boundary situation stabilizes or even if we waved a magic wand and there was a boundary solution found. I want to pick up on something Ambassador Gokhale said, which is that the boundary dispute is a symptom of a larger set of problems. What are the other concerns that India has when it looks at China, whether it’s China’s other relationships, its presence, its vision of the region, what are those other concerns that India has?

MENON: Well, one, of course, is the changed Chinese posture in our immediate periphery in the Indian subcontinent. And her willingness now to be involved in the domestic politics of our neighbors, whether it’s trying to get the two communist parties to work together in Nepal or making clear her preferences in Sri Lanka’s internal politics and so on. Myanmar is a very good example of very deep Chinese involvement in internal politics of a neighbor.

Ultimately the Indian periphery, large parts of the Indian periphery are also China’s periphery. So we rub up against each other in that periphery. So, depending on how successful we are in managing the relationship, this is going to be one of the elements of how we manage the relationship.

But there is a broader problem. Over the last 10 to 15 years, I think that there is an increasing conviction among Indians that China’s the only great power which actually opposes the rise of India, that does not see India’s rise as being good for the international system or themselves. And the proof of that, I mean that most of the public would say, is China’s attitude to India’s quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. But there’s other instances: even membership of the NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group]. And there is that fundamental sense that somehow China stands in the way, China does not want India to rise.

And there is some academic support for this as well. If you look at China’s attitude to her periphery, the Korean Peninsula, Indochina, South Asia, China seeks to keep the periphery divided, free of outside great powers, and keep it relatively weak and therefore dependent on China. And Central Asia and so on.

I think that’s the core problem. And I know that is a mantra that both Indian and Chinese leaders have used in the past, that there is enough space for both India and China to develop, that China is India’s development opportunity, India is China’s development opportunity, et cetera. But I think what’s actually happened in the relationship over the last 15 years or so has made those sound less and less convincing.

So, we actually have a much broader set of issues: China’s behavior in the Indian Ocean, building her first military base in Djibouti, but with the possibility of using other bases and so on and so forth. I mean, India’s interests in peace across the Taiwan Strait, I mean, 38% of India’s foreign trade goes through the South China Sea and past Taiwan.

And so there’s a whole host of issues on which there’s possible friction, which is why it’s important that you start with a proper understanding and a dialogue between the two of you if you want to have any hope of managing these things and turning this shaky, unproductive relationship into something that it is a little more predictable, a little less shaky.

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale, do India and China see the region—Asia, Indo-Pacific, whatever your preferred term is—do the two countries have a similar vision of the region?

GOKHALE: No, I don’t think so. I think that’s part of the problem. If you look even in the 1950s, you know, the Indian approach was that Asians must shape the Asian post-Second World War order, but that India could not do it by itself. It needed other similar-minded countries. And certainly, among them were the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, and so on. And that, I think, remains the general approach today, that India does not believe that it alone can shape the region and it requires partners and friends to do so.

The Chinese approach was very different. They thought that they had won the Second World War, that they had defeated Japan in the Pacific, and that they had the right to shape that Asian order without anybody else being given equal status in that process. And that persists till today because, as Ambassador Menon said right at the beginning, everything is looked at from the Sino-U.S. prism, without recognizing that India has abiding interests and concerns in the region which pre-date anything that happened in the Second World War and even anything that happened before the colonial period. So, I think that really is the issue.

I also just wanted to amplify a point, a very valid point that Ambassador Menon made about changing perceptions. If you were to take a poll, say in 2014, among the university students in India on China, the vast majority looked at China as something aspirational. They admired the GDP growth, the improvement in lifestyle, the introduction of new technologies and so on and so forth. I think after Galwan [in 2020] if you were to take the poll, a very large number of them, probably a majority, would first talk about the tension and problem that China is creating on the border.

So, I think what we are seeing is a long-term impact of the Galwan incident. And I don’t think that will be so easily resolved as and when we start the dialogue. But I do agree with Ambassador Menon that you cannot delay a dialogue between two nuclear-armed neighbors with difficult relations. That has to start at some point, but it won’t change the situation that easily.

MADAN: The description I’ve heard of a similar effort that the U.S. is undertaking is the idea being to stabilize, not necessarily expect any improvement of the relationship. So, stabilization and dialogue rather than expecting improvement.

Ambassador Menon, I do want to pick up on something you’d said earlier, because we’ve talked about now the concerns. There was a period in which there was a phase of cooperation, of engagement, where the bilateral as you said economically, you talked about trade, but also in the multilateral sphere where India and China had been cooperating. What are the areas where you still see India and China engaging—or having the potential to cooperate—that are still present in the relationship?

MENON: Well, some of them are weaker than before, but frankly, in their common interest. We had worked together in the BASIC [Brazil, South Africa, India, China] group on climate change, for instance, in international negotiations on climate change. We’d also worked together on international trade issues together because frankly, we both have a major interest in keeping the world economy from going entirely protectionist or being divided up and fragmented into smaller or large trading blocs—especially India, which is not a member of any of the regional trading agreements.

But in each of these cases, I think the impulse has got a little weaker than it was, say, ten years ago or five years ago. Even though logically it’s in our long-term self-interest to start addressing climate change issues, to start finding ways forward on trade issues, and so on. This would be logical.

But this is where it hurts not to have a functioning, normal political relationship. And this is why I really think, as Vijay just said rightly, Galwan is not just about the border. It’s had long-term effects in many ways, and it prevents the two largest emerging economies of co-operating together in a whole host of issues where they could work together.

Partly it’s because both India and China have evolved also in their own views and their approach to the international system. If you compare it to ten years ago, I think both countries are less open, much less convinced that there’s an enabling climate or environment in which they’re operating.

But most of all, I think it’s because China has turned inward and China is going through a very complicated adjustment, not just economic, but actually of the political and social contract as well and has some big choices to make about her future as her growth slows, as her demography works against her.

So, in that situation—where you don’t have a normal, proper dialogue, you don’t have normal political relationships, where you see a much harsher world environment in which you’re operating, and where one of the countries at least is going through a huge internal churn—it’s hard to be optimistic about them working together even where there is a clear common interest.

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale, given these concerns and particularly after the fatal clash at Galwan in 2020, what is the approach that India has been taking the last few years to deal with this challenge as it sees it from China?

GOKHALE: Yeah, well, Tanvi, I think there are four trends that I notice. Of course, whether these are in the short term or the longer term are still to be determined.

But from the statements made by the Indian leadership, it’s quite clear to me, first of all, that the boundary question has been brought back into the front and center of the relationship, and this is likely to continue even if there is an improvement in the political climate.

Secondly, the public debate in India very much these days centers around the concern that we are economically heavily dependent on the Chinese. I think Ambassador Menon also mentioned this. And there is talk of de-risking. Now, of course, this is a very overused phrase, not only in the Indian context, but in the European and American contexts as well. But in the Indian context, I think there is concern that some of our strategic industries are heavily dependent on Chinese imports and we need to do something about it.

Thirdly, I think it’s very clear that India is looking at strong partnerships in the Indo-Pacific for balance because China is, after all, an $18 trillion economy with a huge military capacity. And therefore, some amount of balancing is needed.

Lastly, if I were to go on the basis of statements made by the government and even by civil society, I think there is at least an effort to prepare public opinion for a longer-term competition with China. I don’t, of course, mean that there is, at least on the Indian side, an effort to generate hostility, but I think there is a concerted effort to refocus the threat, if I were to use that word, from our western neighbor to our northern neighbor. And I think that trend is likely to continue even if the political climate improves.

MADAN: The western neighbor, of course, being Pakistan, India’s other rival, with whom China has a very close relationship going back to at least in the early 1960s.

Ambassador Menon, I want to pick up a thread from Ambassador Gokhale’s four points—the third one on building partnerships. Of course, we’ve seen India deepen ties with the U.S., with Australia, with Japan, with France, with Britain, even countries like South Korea and then some Southeast Asian countries.

I do want to ask you, though, both of you have mentioned the India-U.S. relationship. How does India balance this desire to deepen ties with the U.S.—not just because of the rivalry with China, but also because of its own economic transformation, technological transformation—how does it balance that with the fact, or does it need to balance that with the idea, as both of you have talked about, that China sees India through a U.S. lens, a China-U.S. lens? There have been some in India who have previously, I haven’t heard it recently, but used to argue that India should hold back from deepening ties with the U.S. and others so it doesn’t provoke China. Is that still something people talk about? Is that something India should be doing?

MENON: I’ve never understood anyone who says we should hold back on our relationship with the U.S. because of how China feels about it. I mean, our job is to ultimately to deal with India’s interests, to promote India’s interests. And India has an interest in working with the U.S. I don’t see how we can transform India if we are to have bad relations with the two largest economies of the world, both China and the U.S.

And the U.S. has always been supportive. I mean, we worked with the U.S. to do the Green Revolution in the ‘60s when quite apart from the political relationship, the U.S. has always been essential to India’s transformation. And that’s going to continue.

So, from an Indian point of view, that is really the driving force. The geopolitics is jam. And, I’ve said myself that China maybe is the strategic glue in the relationship today because for the U.S., the U.S. sees this relationship too, from a geopolitical point of view, from the standpoint of its effect on its relations with China. But for me, the primary driver of it from an Indian point of view is really India’s transformation.

So, for India to then say, oh, because somebody else will be offended, I’m not going to do what’s in my interest doesn’t make sense to me. Today, India and the U.S. have transformed their relationship over the last two and a half decades. They do almost everything that allies do. And when you see the depth and the breadth of what we’re doing, it’s really quite impressive. I don’t think anyone would have predicted this 20 years ago.

But as you said, it’s not just India and the U.S. For India’s transformation we need to work across the board, through the Indo-Pacific and the entire maritime Asia. You look at the relationship with Japan, or with Indonesia, with the Philippines, with Vietnam, with Singapore. These have all today qualitatively being upgraded. And even the relationships much closer home have changed considerably.

So, if the China challenge leads us to do what is good for us, frankly, I welcome it. And if the China challenge also brings us new friends who are willing to cooperate with us, I mean, that’s good news. In fact, I think we owe some of our friendships to the Chinese; we should be grateful to them for that.

But what you’re seeing now is a multi-directional Indian policy. Balancing China is one part of it. But more important is embedding India in relationships which help to create an environment within which India’s transformation can be enabled. And that’s, for me, the ultimate goal of this.

China can choose to be part of that. Could have.

After what’s happened, and especially after Galwan [in 2020], that choice seems very difficult for China to make, and China doesn’t seem to have made that choice.

In fact, it’s for me a conundrum. Why has China chosen to alienate so many of her neighbors in the last ten years?

And she has offered her own vision recently in a Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, the whole Belt and Road Initiative, et cetera. But these are all China-centered ideas.

And why didn’t she choose a cooperative framework within which to work with her neighbors and others? I still don’t understand that because it seems to me that would have served both the region and China herself better than what we’ve seen instead.

Today, you look at what’s happened to the India-China relationship thanks to Chinese actions. You look at what’s happened to China-Japan relations. Which leads me to believe that you therefore have to go beyond traditional IR [international relations theory] explanations or rational explanations for behavior, and you end up then with personalities and ideologies and other “irrational explanations.”

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale, any thoughts on that? But also, I was going to ask both of you a question on—we’ve heard a lot of chatter, especially in Western publications actually—about an India-China détente or even friendship. I’m taking it from what both of you are saying is that is not on the cards. But what would it take— you both have mentioned return to some sort of dialogue—what would you have in mind? Both in terms of what would the objectives of the dialogues be and what are the realistic expectations of something like that? And what are the limits of that kind of process as well that people should keep in mind?

GOKHALE: Well, you know, when you ask me whether there is any possibility of détente or friendship, as a former diplomat anything is possible. Right? But if you ask me, is friendship likely, I would say no. If you say, is détente likely, I would say it is more likely. But I think it needs two to tango, or two to clap hands. And I would say that there will be a couple of, I wouldn’t use the word preconditions, but certainly a couple of circumstances that have to change if that détente is to take place.

Firstly, I think we need to go back to respecting the status quo along the border region of the two countries. In other words, we should go back to a stable and predictable border regime which gives a sense of security to both sides.

Secondly, I think there needs to be a return to a favorite Chinese phrase, which is we must show mutual sensitivity to each other’s concerns and interests—which in the 2010s meant that India must show concern for Chinese interests because they’re global, but China need not reciprocate because India’s interests are very local, and therefore it’s not a big issue. I think we have to go back to respecting each other’s mutual interests and concerns.

Thirdly, I think the whole issue of sharing space, which Ambassador Menon alluded to, because as he said our strategic peripheries are colliding, means that certainly we need to respect each other’s positions in those shared spaces. And that does require a recognition that India has a very long-standing historical, cultural, and geographical connect with all of South Asia, large parts of Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region.

So, I am not saying détente is not possible, but I don’t think the conditions for it exist as of yet. At the moment I think our engagement is basically risk management or risk mitigation, and there is no political dialogue to speak of.

MADAN:  Ambassador Menon, on the flip side, what are the prospects of a crisis escalation in the India-China relationship?

MENON: Well, in this case, it’s the Chinese who took the initiative to change the situation and the nature of the relationship. And what they are signaling now is that they like this uncertainty by saying, let’s put this behind us and let life go on as normal without addressing the issues and without actually trying to make sure that this doesn’t happen again. So, it’s not as though they’re signaling some great unhappiness, which they are about to try and change. So, they’re not going back, but they’re not going forward either.

I think the Indian government has made it clear that what it wants to do is to restore the peace and the tranquility on the border and that this is its first priority there. So, it’s done what it needs to in terms of defensive steps—military deployments and so on, building new infrastructure.

So, is there a risk of this escalating? I mean, you can never rule this out when troops are facing each other, over a hundred thousand troops along that line, at these altitudes. You can never say there’s zero risk. But I wouldn’t say that the political conditions exist right now for this to escalate into … there could be incidents. And the risk is without, as I said, crisis management measures in place or understanding of CBMs which work and so on, and good channels of communication.

With that, these things could be unpredictable; could get out of hand.

But I don’t see the political interest on either side. We’re going in for a general election next year. No government wants to face that kind of thing when it’s also facing an election. And on the Chinese side, as I said, they seem happy with the uncertainty, with the threat in place, as it were, a threat in being. So, I’ll never rule it out, but yes, I don’t see it as imminent or somehow explosive.

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale, looking ahead, if you had to flag a few things in terms of the future trajectory or key issue areas of competition or cooperation in India-China relations, what would you tell our audience that they should keep an eye on? Or what are you keeping your eye on, two or three things or even more over the next few months, the next year, or the next couple of years?

GOKHALE: Well, one is, of course, what sort of leadership-level interaction takes place over the coming months and years and what are the concrete outcomes? Do the leaders meet, and do they build, rebuild mutual understanding? Do they actually set some goalposts together for the two sides to achieve? I think that’s an obvious thing to look out for.

I think if there is a shift in their view on the border region, if there is a willingness to resolve the two current outstanding issues leftover from 2020, or if we see other ground level changes—let us say de-escalation and even de-induction of forces—I think that would be a, could be a signal.

I’d say also that in India at least, we would keep an eye on the state of relations between China and the United States because they are the two most consequential powers in the world. And anything that they might or might not do together will influence and impact all the rest of us.

If you were to ask me an immediate sign, I would certainly say that it is unnatural that the Chinese have not appointed an ambassador in New Delhi for close to a year. So, if that takes place, that too I think would be at least an indication that there is a willingness to move things forward.

But I just want to also add to the previous answer that Ambassador Menon gave. I agree with him that the Chinese tactic so far has been gray-zone warfare, or military operations other than war. I find it difficult to believe that they would want to engage in a larger scale conflict which would turn the relationship very adversarial. I don’t see how it benefits them. Of course, governments and countries don’t necessarily act logically. But if we were to assume that the decision-makers in Beijing were rational people, then it is unlikely that there will be an escalation in the situation. Except if there is a catastrophic development in the region, and I would think that the Taiwan Straits crisis might be that sort of a trigger, but that would be very speculative.

MADAN: I will then ask you the lightning round question. We’re going to ask this at the end of every episode. We have a choice of a few, but I’ll ask you the one that is on top of my mind: what do you think is the biggest myth or misunderstanding that you hear about India-China relations? Whether it’s in India, whether it’s abroad, what do you think that biggest myth is?

MENON: That this is all some historical animosity, it’s a question left over from history. We’ve been independent 75 years now. We’re grown up. I think we take responsibility for what we do. It’s convenient to say this is all left over from history and blame the British for whatever there is and we’re not responsible. And maybe it opens up space to compromise. But it’s time, I think, that leaders on both sides took responsibility for what they do and say.

MADAN: Ambassador Gokhale?

GOKHALE: Well, I’ll tell you what I think is the greatest myth the Chinese are spreading: that relations between India and China for the past 2,000 years have been 99.9% good and only 0.01% bad, which is an aberration. Because, you know, frankly, the two countries don’t have much of a history together over 2,000 years. I think Tibet separated us. There was no real direct political contact. Trade and spiritual exchanges and cultural exchanges continued. But you can’t really characterize this as a deep-seated relationship which was fine for 99.9% of the time. The Chinese, of course, love spreading this myth.

MENON: In fact, just to add to what he said: we had a relationship with Tibet, we had a boundary with Tibet, which was agreed with Tibet for the most part. We didn’t have a boundary with China until the PRC invaded Tibet in 1950. And that’s one of the myths that whatever Tibet did that somehow that all that devolves on China. I mean, historically, they’re quite ahistorical in the way they apply history to serve today’s purposes.

MADAN: In fact, that connects to my myth—and this often comes [up] here where I’m sitting in the U.S.—which is that India-China frictions are fairly new and only [just] started, that there were concerns about China only in 2020. When it actually does go back, even in independent India to almost the beginning, if not the 1950s, and that it’s only India of all the Quad—Australia, Japan, U.S., India—that has consistently seen China as a challenge since the 1950s.

With that, Ambassador Menon, Ambassador Gokhale, thank you so much for joining us for this inaugural episode of the Global India podcast. We know that some of the issues you mentioned we’re going to have additional details and episodes on these in the future. But thank you very much for joining us.

GOKHALE: Thank you.

MENON: Thank you, Tanvi.

MADAN: Thank you for tuning in to the Global India podcast. I’m Tanvi Madan, senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. You can find research about India and more episodes of this show on our website, Brookings dot edu slash Global India.

Global India is brought to you by the Brookings Podcast Network, and we’ll be releasing new episodes every two weeks. Send any feedback or questions to podcasts at Brookings dot edu.

My thanks to the production team, including Kuwilileni Hauwanga, supervising producer; Fred Dews and Raman Preet Kaur, producers; Gastón Reboredo, audio engineer; and Daniel Morales, video editor.

My thanks also to Alexandra Dimsdale and Hanna Foreman for their support, and to Shavanthi Mendis, who designed the show art. Additional support for the podcast comes from my colleagues in the Foreign Policy program and the Office of Communications at Brookings.

China India South Asia

Foreign Policy

Asia & the Pacific China India South Asia

Center for Asia Policy Studies

Tara Varma, Tanvi Madan

February 21, 2024

Lisa Curtis, Joshua T. White, Tanvi Madan

February 7, 2024

Ryan Hass, Tanvi Madan

January 24, 2024

India-China Relations Are Unlikely to See Much Progress

By: Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

February 15, 2024

India-China relations are unlikely to see much progress in the coming year. Tensions between the two countries increased dramatically after a clash along their disputed border in 2020. Despite more than a dozen rounds of talks since then, there has been no resolution and only minor progress. While it may not be in the interests of either India or China to let the situation escalate, the risk is real.

There are several reasons for the intense dispute between the two Asian giants. One is the worsening balance of power between the two countries, which increases Indian insecurity. India is an emerging power with a fast-growing economy, but China’s rise has been far more impressive and consequential. That China has been able to bring its vast economic resources and influence to bear at both the regional level and even globally has put great pressure on India.

This political pressure has been wielded by Beijing against India at a number of points. For example, China scuttled India’s application for membership to the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG), despite a personal appeal from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China’s leader Xi Jinping. India has been seeking membership to the NSG, a nuclear technology control regime, for several years as part of its efforts to integrate with the global non-proliferation architecture. 1 Similarly, China has repeatedly used its influence to block India’s proposals to place individuals in Pakistan wanted by India on terror charges on a United Nations watchlist.  

Beyond such political pressure, the growing imbalance also matters in relative military power. U.S.-China competition means that China’s military power is growing fast. For example, China has concurrently developed two stealth fighter planes, making it the only country other than the United States to do so. 2 For a long time, India was proud to be the only Asian country operating aircraft carriers, but China now has two operational carriers, and its new class of aircraft carrier has nearly twice the displacement of India’s. Beijing is also building naval vessels at a pace that India cannot match. Sooner than later, these carriers will likely begin to operate in waters closer to India. Although India has not made any official public comment yet, China’s recent and unprecedented nuclear weapon expansion will also likely begin to gnaw at India’s deterrent force.  

The gap in military power between India and China is at least partly because India’s conventional military power is suffering due to years of underinvestment and neglect. Quoting a senior defense official, one Indian media report cited an acute shortage of artillery guns, main battle tanks and light tanks, infantry combat vehicles and assorted helicopter types and even assault rifles, carbines and sniper rifles.  

Meanwhile, the Indian Navy is struggling to keep its inventory afloat amid its quickly depleting underwater fleet. India has 15 tactical submarines , many of which should have been retired several years ago but have had their operational lives extended with repairs and modifications. The Indian Air Force also faces serious shortages. Against a fighter squadron strength of 42, the Indian Air Force has merely 29 squadrons in addition to other critical inadequacies , including mid-air refuelers and rotary-wing aircraft. Compounding these issues, India has been worrying about the possibility of a two-front threat in which China and Pakistan coordinate to put military pressure on India.  

These insecurities are further exacerbated because India and China share an un-demarcated and disputed border. While there is a long historical context to the border conflict, China has pushed forward in the recent past. In 2017, this led to a 71-day stand-off in an area called Doklam at the India-China-Bhutan trijunction. More recently, in 2020, China appears to have deliberately instigated a clash in the Galwan River Valley that resulted in dozens of casualties.  

After more than three years, and despite 19 rounds of military-level talks and a number of meetings between the foreign ministers—and even between the two leaders on the sidelines of other summit meetings—there has been no disengagement of the military forces. There are still more than 60,000 troops on each side of the border on regular deployment, which brings with it serious risk of escalation. There is little sign that either side has much flexibility, which means that the border issue is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.  

As India-China relations have worsened, India’s response has increased China’s insecurities. To China’s discomfort, India has accelerated its partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia, especially through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad). However, these are not comfortable relationships for India, as occasional developments indicate. The Indian position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the continuing dalliance with Moscow suggest that even though New Delhi may be enhancing the level of its partnership with the United States and its other Quad partners, Russia will continue to be an important security partner for India. That India is deepening partnerships with the United States and its allies despite its own discomfort says a lot about how insecure New Delhi feels about China’s power and behavior.

Nevertheless, this also means that India-China relations will get even more challenging. China initially dismissed the Quad as just “ sea foam ” that will dissipate soon, but Beijing has become harsher as the grouping has slowly deepened security partnerships across the region. Their relationship is increasingly taking on the appearance of a spiraling security dilemma, as their responses to each other ratchet up their conflict.  

Dr. Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. As a senior Asia defense writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues.

• Foreign Affairs
• CFR Education
• Newsletters

Climate Change

Global Climate Agreements: Successes and Failures

Backgrounder by Lindsay Maizland December 5, 2023 Renewing America

• Defense & Security
• Diplomacy & International Institutions
• Energy & Environment
• Human Rights
• Politics & Government
• Social Issues

Myanmar’s Troubled History

Backgrounder by Lindsay Maizland January 31, 2022

• Europe & Eurasia
• Global Commons
• Middle East & North Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

How Tobacco Laws Could Help Close the Racial Gap on Cancer

Interactive by Olivia Angelino, Thomas J. Bollyky , Elle Ruggiero and Isabella Turilli February 1, 2023 Global Health Program

• Backgrounders
• Special Projects

United States

Reagan: His Life and Legend

Book by Max Boot September 10, 2024

• Centers & Programs
• Books & Reports
• Independent Task Force Program
• Fellowships

Oil and Petroleum Products

Academic Webinar: The Geopolitics of Oil

Webinar with Carolyn Kissane and Irina A. Faskianos April 12, 2023

• Students and Educators
• State & Local Officials
• Religion Leaders
• Local Journalists

NATO’s Future: Enlarged and More European?

Virtual Event with Emma M. Ashford, Michael R. Carpenter, Camille Grand, Thomas Wright, Liana Fix and Charles A. Kupchan June 25, 2024 Europe Program

• Lectureship Series
• Webinars & Conference Calls
• Member Login

The China-India Border Dispute: What to Know

By Alyssa Ayres , CFR Expert

June 18, 2020 3:20 pm (EST)

China and India’s border dispute turned deadly for the first time in more than four decades. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s response will be critical to de-escalation.

Thousands of Chinese and Indian troops have been in a standoff in the Ladakh region high in the Himalayas since early May. After reaching an agreement to de-escalate on June 6 , the mutual withdrawal of troops from the Galwan Valley went dramatically wrong on June 15, with Indian army officials reporting clashes that resulted in twenty deaths . China’s government and media have not provided casualty figures for Chinese troops, but unconfirmed Indian media reports indicated that more than forty died.

Speaking by phone on June 17, both the Chinese and Indian foreign ministers agreed to avoid actions that might escalate the conflict. The same day, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized in a TV address that “India wants peace. But on provocation, India will give a befitting reply.”

Why are Chinese and Indian troops there in the first place?

Wars and Conflict

Narendra Modi

Both countries’ troops have patrolled this region for decades, as the contested 2,200-mile border [PDF] is a long-standing subject of competing claims and tensions, including a brief war in 1962. The border, or Line of Actual Control , is not demarcated, and China and India have differing ideas of where it should be located, leading to regular border “ transgressions .” Often these don’t escalate tensions; a serious border standoff like the current one is less frequent, though this is the fourth since 2013.

The Ladakh region is especially complex, with particularly unusual features. First, there is Aksai Chin , a territory that India has long claimed but China occupies. China began building a road through the area in 1956—linking Tibet to Xinjiang—and has occupied it since 1962. There is also territory that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963. Surveying and mapping the region’s terrain historically proved immensely challenging. A forthcoming history of the Ladakh region points out how colonial-era efforts to survey this area using natural features such as watersheds as focal points did not always align with cartographic needs for precision, and, importantly, ideas of where a country’s territory begins and ends.

Why have tensions escalated now?

There’s no clear reason why tensions have escalated now to their worst in decades—with the first fatalities in forty-five years. And New Delhi and Beijing hold very different views of what happened the night of June 15. India pointed to “premeditated” Chinese action that “reflected an intent to change the facts on the ground in violation of all our agreements to not change the status quo.” China said that “Indian frontline border forces openly broke the consensus reached.”

The World This Week

A weekly digest of the latest from cfr on the biggest foreign policy stories of the week, featuring briefs, opinions, and explainers. every friday., daily news brief, a summary of global news developments with cfr analysis delivered to your inbox each morning.  weekdays., think global health.

A curation of original analyses, data visualizations, and commentaries, examining the debates and efforts to improve health worldwide.  Weekly.

Explanations circulating in the Indian and international media cover a broad range: China was unhappy with India’s actions in August 2019 to end Jammu and Kashmir’s traditional autonomy, one result of which was the creation of the Union Territory of Ladakh ; China saw India’s recent road construction work in the area as a change to the status quo and a challenge to its strategic position; China dislikes India drawing closer to the United States and its allies in Asia; China seeks to distract attention from its part in the global pandemic; and the frank appraisal that India’s growing military imbalance with China, and China’s “political will” to deploy its might under President Xi Jinping, is the real difference. 

What are the prospects for a peaceful resolution?

China’s moves are hard to gauge, and as many scholars have noted , India’s options are limited. Modi said in his June 17 address that India’s “sovereignty is supreme,” indicating that accepting a territorial shift in China’s favor likely will not be his next step. But looking for conflict at a time of economic downturn and still-rising coronavirus cases is not a good option, either. New Delhi will likely assess other nonmilitary policy options. The blanket calls to boycott Chinese products have gained some mass appeal in India, but the government may take further steps, such as increasing scrutiny on inbound investment from China, similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review process. India recently announced review procedures for foreign investment from “neighboring” countries, and this net could expand further. China is a source of investment [PDF] in some of India’s top start-ups. And press reports have already identified forthcoming restrictions on Chinese equipment in India’s large and growing telecom sector, including a likely ban on Chinese companies’ involvement in building 5G infrastructure.

Despite long-standing border tensions, the two giants have significant multilateral cooperation, including through alternate global institutions created over the past decade. The BRICS bloc, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in which India is the second-largest capital contributor; the New Development Bank; and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which India recently joined, have all been arenas for cooperation despite the countries’ ongoing security competition. But with escalating security tensions, New Delhi may reexamine its level of interaction in other areas.

Finally, the border clash will likely illustrate for India’s foreign policy planners that its preferred formulation—“ the world is one family ,” derived from a Sanskrit saying—does not apply to all its bilateral relationships, unless the interpretation of “one family” includes family members working against India’s national interests. From this realization, India may begin to make more choices about its partnerships, recognizing that it isn’t possible to maintain equal ties with all indefinitely.

Explore More on India

India’s Muslims: An Increasingly Marginalized Population

Backgrounder by Lindsay Maizland March 18, 2024

What Did Prime Minister Modi’s State Visit Achieve?

Blog Post by Manjari Chatterjee Miller June 26, 2023 Asia Unbound

Modi's State Visit: Prospects for the U.S.-India Relationship and Navigating the Global Order

Blog Post by Manjari Chatterjee Miller June 21, 2023 Asia Unbound

Top Stories on CFR

WHO Declares Mpox a Global Health Emergency. Why? Link

via Council on Foreign Relations with Thomas J. Bollyky August 15, 2024

How the U.S. Can Counter Disinformation From Russia and China

Expert Brief by Dana S. LaFon August 14, 2024

Africa and the Gulf Are Growing Closer. Will It Increase Global Tensions?

In Brief by Alexandra Dent and Mariel Ferragamo August 8, 2024

• Classroom Programme
• Interview Guidance
• Online Programme
• Drishti Store
• My Bookmarks
• My Progress
• Change Password
• From The Editor's Desk
• How To Use The New Website
• Help Centre

Achievers Corner

• Topper's Interview
• About Civil Services
• UPSC Prelims Syllabus
• GS Prelims Strategy
• Prelims Analysis
• GS Paper-I (Year Wise)
• GS Paper-I (Subject Wise)
• CSAT Strategy
• Previous Years Papers
• Practice Quiz
• Weekly Revision MCQs
• 60 Steps To Prelims
• Prelims Refresher Programme 2020

Mains & Interview

• Mains GS Syllabus
• Mains GS Strategy
• Mains Answer Writing Practice
• Essay Strategy
• Fodder For Essay
• Model Essays
• Drishti Essay Competition
• Ethics Strategy
• Ethics Case Studies
• Ethics Discussion
• Ethics Previous Years Q&As
• Papers By Years
• Papers By Subject
• Be MAINS Ready
• Awake Mains Examination 2020
• Interview Strategy
• Interview Guidance Programme

Current Affairs

• Daily News & Editorial
• Daily CA MCQs
• Sansad TV Discussions
• Monthly CA Consolidation
• Monthly Editorial Consolidation
• Monthly MCQ Consolidation

Drishti Specials

• To The Point
• Important Institutions
• Learning Through Maps
• PRS Capsule
• Summary Of Reports
• Gist Of Economic Survey

Study Material

• NCERT Books
• NIOS Study Material
• IGNOU Study Material
• Yojana & Kurukshetra
• Chhatisgarh
• Uttar Pradesh
• Madhya Pradesh

Test Series

• UPSC Prelims Test Series
• UPSC Mains Test Series
• UPPCS Prelims Test Series
• UPPCS Mains Test Series
• BPSC Prelims Test Series
• RAS/RTS Prelims Test Series
• Daily Editorial Analysis
• YouTube PDF Downloads
• Strategy By Toppers
• Ethics - Definition & Concepts
• Mastering Mains Answer Writing
• Places in News
• UPSC Mock Interview
• PCS Mock Interview
• Interview Insights
• Prelims 2019
• Product Promos
• Daily Updates

International Relations

Make Your Note

India-China: 70 Years of Diplomatic Relations

• 01 Apr 2020
• GS Paper - 2
• India and its Neighbourhood
• Bilateral Groupings & Agreements
• Groupings & Agreements Involving India and/or Affecting India's Interests
• Global Groupings
• Regional Groupings
• International Treaties & Agreements

Why in News

India and China mark the 1 st April 2020 as the 70 th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between them starting from 1950 till now.

• India and China established diplomatic relations on 1 st April 1950.
• India was the first non-socialist country to establish relations with the People's Republic of China and the catchphrase ‘Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’ became famous.
• Both countries attended the Asian-African Conference in which 29 countries participated in Bandung, Indonesia and jointly advocated the Bandung Spirit of solidarity, friendship and cooperation.
• It has led to the decolonisation of the whole of Asia and Africa and to the formation of a Non-Aligned Movement as the third Way between the Two Blocs of Superpowers.
• The First NAM Summit Conference took place in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in September 1961.
• The border conflict led to a serious setback in bilateral relations.
• China and India restored ambassadorial relations and bilateral ties improved gradually.
• Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China, initiating the process of normalization of bilateral relations.
• The two sides agreed to look forward and develop bilateral relations actively in other fields while seeking a mutually acceptable solution to boundary questions.
• Indian President R. Venkataraman visited China.
• He was the first President who visited China since the independence of the Republic of India.
• Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited India.
• He was the first head of state from China who visited India since the establishment of bilateral ties.
• Agreement between the Government of China and the Government of India on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas was signed.
• Indian President K R Narayanan visited China on the occasion of the 50 th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and India.
• "A Shared Vision for the 21 st Century" was agreed upon by the two governments.
• The 60 th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and India.
• In December, the two countries issued a Joint Communiqué.
• It was the ‘China-India Exchange Year’.
• Both sides held a series of people-to-people and cultural exchange activities.
• Both of them signed a memorandum on joint compilation for the ‘Encyclopedia of India-China Cultural Contacts’.
• It was the ‘Year of China-India Friendship and Cooperation’.
• The head of the governments met each other on the sidelines of the 4 th BRICS Summit and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.
• The two sides met on the sidelines of the 7 th BRICS Summit in Ufa, Russia and the Leaders' Meetings on East Asia Cooperation in Malaysia.
• China decided to open the Nathu La Pass (Sikkim) to Indian official pilgrims to Xizang.
• India celebrated the India Tourism Year in China.
• Chinese President held an informal meeting with Indian Prime Minister in Wuhan which set up a new model of exchanges between two leaders.
• Indian Prime Minister visited China to attend the SCO Summit in Qingdao.
• The two leaders met again on the sidelines of the 10 th BRICS Summit and the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires.
• The second informal meeting was held in Mamallapuram, Chennai which reaffirmed the Wuhan consensus.
• Both nations agreed to build a closer partnership for development, enhance the in-depth strategic communication, promote mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields and advance exchanges and mutual learning between the two civilizations.
• Both sides met on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Bishkek and the 11 th BRICS Summit.
• It marks the year of the 70 th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India.
• It is also China-India Year of Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges, where the two sides agreed to hold 70 celebratory activities to demonstrate the historic connection between the two civilizations as well as their growing bilateral relationship.

Facts and Figures on China-India Cooperation

• The Communist Party of China (CPC) has maintained friendly exchanges with 9 major Indian political parties including the BJP, Congress and left-wing parties for a long time.
• 20 Inter-parliamentary friendship groups have been set up by China and India.
• There are 50 dialogue mechanisms between China and India for exchanging views on various topics of bilateral, regional and global concern.
• In 2019, the trade volume between China and India was $92.68 billion.
• With a combined market of over 2.7 billion people and a GDP of 20% of the world's total, China and India enjoy huge potential and broad prospects for economic and trade cooperation.
• Both nations have held Joint Research workshops on Science and Technology Innovation.
• Indian companies have set up IT corridors in China, which help promote China-India cooperation in information technology and high technology.
• ‘Hand-in-Hand’ joint anti-terrorist exercises to enhance mutual understanding and trust, exchange training experiences and jointly improve anti-terrorism capabilities.
• China-India defense and security consultation to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the defense field.
• Both nations have held meetings of China-India High-Level People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges Mechanism. The two sides have made new progress on exchanges and cooperation in the fields of art, publishing, media, film and television, museum, sports, youth, tourism, locality, traditional medicine, yoga, education and think tanks.
• Sessions of China-India High Level Media Forum and China-India Think Tank Forum were held to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the field of media and think tanks.
• The two countries have established pairs of sister cities and provinces. For example, sister provinces and cities between Fujian Province and Tamil Nadu State, Quanzhou City and Chennai City.
• The number of Indian pilgrims to Xizang Autonomous Region of China has surged from several hundreds in the 1980s to more than 20,000 in 2019.

Way Forward

• Today's achievements of India-China relations embodied the great efforts of several generations.
• Leading: It means to reach consensus and guide the direction of the development of bilateral relations under the guidance of leaders from both nations.
• Transmitting: It means to transmit the leaders’ consensus to all levels and translate it into tangible cooperation and outcomes.
• Shaping: It means to go beyond the mode of managing differences, shape bilateral relations actively and accumulate positive momentum.
• Integrating: It means to strengthen exchanges and cooperation, promote convergence of interests and achieve common development.
• At this moment, it is particularly important to revisit the original aspiration of establishing diplomatic relations 70 years ago and carry forward the spirit of good neighborliness and friendship, unity and cooperation.

Celebrate Independence Day with PW Upto 60% Off on UPSC Online Courses

• UPSC Online
• UPSC offline and Hybrid
• UPSC Optional Coaching
• UPPCS Online
• BPSC Online
• MPSC Online
• MPPSC Online
• WBPSC Online
• OPSC Online
• UPPCS Offline Coaching
• BPSC Offline Coaching
• UPSC Test Series
• State PSC Test Series
• DAILY CURRENT AFFAIRS
• SUBJECT WISE CURRENT AFFAIRS
• DAILY EDITORIAL ANALYSIS
• DAILY CURRENT AFFAIRS QUIZ
• Daily Prelims(MCQs) Practice
• Daily Mains Answer Writing
• Free Resources

• Offline Centres
• NCERT Notes
• UDAAN Notes
• UPSC Syllabus
• UPSC Prelims PYQs
• UPSC Mains PYQs

India China Relations: Evolution Timeline, Border Disputes, and Challenges

This Article is based on the news “ Jaishankar to China: It’s in our common interest not to mass troops at the LAC ” which was published in the Indian Express. China has lodged a diplomatic protest with India over the Prime Minister’s (PM’s) visit to Arunachal Pradesh , where he dedicated the newly-built Sela Tunnel to the nation . 

Sela Tunnel inauguration: China lodges Diplomatic Protest Over PM Modi’s Arunachal visit

• It connects Assam’s Tezpur to the West Kameng district in Arunachal Pradesh. 
• It will also ensure better movement of troops along the frontier region. 
• Chinese Objections: China claims Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet routinely objects to Indian leaders’ visits to the state to highlight its claims. China has also named the area as Zangnan.
• Rejection of Chinese Territorial Claims: India has repeatedly rejected China’s territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh, asserting that the state is an integral part of the country.

Evolution of India China Relations: A Timeline

India china relations – early years (1950s-1960s):.

• 1950: India recognizes the People’s Republic of China, and establishes diplomatic relations.
• 1954: Signing of Panchsheel Agreement emphasizing peaceful coexistence.
• 1962: Sino-Indian War over border disputes, China wins decisively.

India China Relations – Post-war Scenario:

• 1959-1962: Unilateral changes to the Line of Actual Control , leading to conflict.
• Decades later, China claims Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part, straining ties.

India China Relations – Strategic Distance (1970s-1980s):

• Limited diplomatic and trade engagements due to mutual distrust.
• India’s closeness with the Soviet Union and China’s stance against the USSR heighten tensions.
• Deng Xiaoping’s reforms from 1978 paved the way for economic growth , and openness.

India China Relations – Efforts for Normalization (1980s):

• 1988: Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China marks significant advancement.
• Agreements were signed to maintain peace along the border, Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) was established in 2012.

Post-Cold War Era (1990s onwards):

• Economic cooperation rises as focal point, significant increase in trade and investment.

India China Relations – 2003: 

• Occasional military standoffs over regions like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

India China Relations – Recent Developments:

• 2017 : Doklam standoff leads to significant strain.
• June 2020: Galwan Valley Clash results in casualties on both sides, intensifying tensions.

India China Relations: Bilateral Ties

• Political: On 1 April, 1950, India became the first non-socialist bloc country to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. 
• Economic Ties: Bilateral trade has grown significantly, reaching US$100 billion by 2022 , with India becoming a large market for project exports from China.
• Cultural: India and China have a history of cultural exchanges and have established institutions like the Yoga College in China. 

• Multilateral cooperation: India and China continue high-level engagement at regional fora such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS groupings reflecting common agenda for growth and development. 
• Both countries have initiated the “ hometown diplomacy ”, held two informal summits in Wuhan and Chennai respectively.

Challenges Associated with India China Relations

Five finger policy: .

• China considers Tibet to be the right hand’s palm of China with Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) as its five fingers.
• An estimated 50,000-60,000 troops have been posted on either side of the India-China border in eastern Ladakh.

Salami Slicing Strategy: 

• For instance , China has constructed around  628 well-off villages along India’s borders with the Tibet Autonomous Region, understood as dual-use infrastructure for both civil and military purposes.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): 

• India opposes China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) , as it violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity , as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through parts of the Pakistan occupied Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Aggressive Policies in the Neighbourhood: 

• String of Pearls is a geopolitical and geostrategic initiative which includes a network of Chinese military and commercial facilities which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa. Ex- Hambantota port.

Debt Trap Diplomacy: 

• Recent change in Maldives’ stance towards India, setting a deadline for withdrawal of Indian troops from Maldives, is a consequence of its growing proximity to China.

India’s Import Dependency: 

• Further, India’s dependency on Key Starting Materials (KSM) from China exceeds 50% for its Pharmaceutical industry.

Water Dispute: 

• No formal treaty has been established for the sharing of the Brahmaputra River water has been a significant source of tension with China constructing numerous dams in the upper reaches of the river on which India has raised objections.

South China Sea and India: 

• China’s “Nine-Dash Line” refers to a demarcation line used by the People’s Republic of China to assert its territorial claims in the South China Sea .
• China recently voiced objection to Vietnam’s invitation for India to invest in the oil and natural gas sector in the contested SCS .

Way Forward to India China Relations

India china border disputes resolution: .

• Both nations engage in more regular dialogue at the highest levels. Both should seek to adapt the principle of “mutual and equal security ” i.e., military deployments of mutually acceptable size near the borde r – to the reality of a heavily militarised frontier. 

Economic Cooperation: 

• India should try to facilitate the development of alternate global supply chains and diversify the imports from other countries.
• India may also consider signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China in order to boost its exports to China. 

Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Mechanism: 

• There is an urgent need to build structures and capabilities to counter Chinese grey zone threats. 
• This should include d eployment of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) , introduction of Rafale jets to bolster border security, joint military exercises, etc.

Cultural Diplomacy:  

• Initiatives such as student exchange programs, cultural festivals, and joint research projects .
• Language exchange programs can also help in fostering confidence and trust among the people of both countries.

Track Diplomacy:  

• Track One diplomacy refers to formal negotiations between nations conducted by professional diplomats. 
• Track Two diplomacy refers to conflict resolution efforts by professional non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners .

Proper Implementation of Vibrant Villages Programme: 

• Vibrant Villages Programme was introduced in Budget 2023-24 for the development of villages in states bordering China, i.e., Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

Replicating ANC to other Regions: 

• The ANC has proved that units of India’s three armed forces can march, sail, fly and fight “jointly” and seamlessly, under a single commander. 
• The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) is an integrated tri-services command of the Indian Armed Forces, based at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

To get PDF version, Please click on "Print PDF" button.

• Recent Post
• Related Post
• Most Viewed Post

News in Shorts: 19 August 2024

Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)

Deceptive Dark Patterns

FSSAI Addresses Microplastic Contamination in Food

Green Tug Transition Program

Revamp of Centrally Sponsored Schemes

Social Stock Exchange

Prime- minister’s egypt state visit, arsenic and fluoride in groundwater, who launches icd 11 – a traditional medicine module 2:..., latest comments, recent editorial.

Bureaucracy defends the status quo long past the t...

Apathy Continues: On Africa and the Mpox Vaccine R...

Ensuring social justice in the bureaucracy

The essence of India’s Inflation Problem

Does India Lack a Sporting Culture Outside Cricket...

Freedom Notes: On the Independence Day Speech and ...

Popular current affairs

Our courses.

THE MOST LEARNING PLATFORM

Learn From India's Best Faculty

Our Initiatives

Beginner’s roadmap, quick links.

PW-Only IAS came together specifically to carry their individual visions in a mission mode. Infusing affordability with quality and building a team where maximum members represent their experiences of Mains and Interview Stage and hence, their reliability to better understand and solve student issues.

Subscribe our Newsletter

Sign up now for our exclusive newsletter and be the first to know about our latest Initiatives, Quality Content, and much more.

Contact Details

G-Floor,4-B Pusha Road, New Delhi, 110060

• +91 9920613613
• [email protected]

Download Our App

Biginner's roadmap, suscribe now form, fill the required details to get early access of quality content..

Join Us Now

(Promise! We Will Not Spam You.)

CURRENT AF.

<div class="new-fform">

Select centre Online Mode Hybrid Mode PWonlyIAS Delhi (ORN) PWonlyIAS Delhi (MN) PWonlyIAS Lucknow PWonlyIAS Patna Other

Select course UPSC Online PSC ONline UPSC + PSC ONLINE UPSC Offline PSC Offline UPSC+PSC Offline UPSC Hybrid PSC Hybrid UPSC+PSC Hybrid Other

</div>

• IAS Preparation
• UPSC Preparation Strategy
• India China Relations

India-China Relations: Notes for UPSC

India-China relations is an important topic from the GS Paper II, International Relations perspective of the UPSC Exam.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established on October 1, 1949, and India was the first non-communist country to establish an Embassy in PRC. On April 1, 1950, India and China established diplomatic relations. The two countries also jointly expounded the Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) in 1954.

India and China mark the 1 st  of April 2020 as the 70 th  anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between them starting from 1950 till now.

To know about the basic overview of India’s Foreign Policy , visit the linked article.

From the  IAS Exam  perspective, the relation between India and China is an important topic and aspirants must be aware of the latest bilateral development between the two countries.

India-China Relations:- Download PDF Here

India-China Relations – Latest Developments

• Army Chief Gen Manoj Naravane had taken a review of the situation and announced that further steps will be taken to de-escalate the situation while calling for restrain from personnel of both the Armies.
• A major incident had occurred in the stand-off between India and China in Ladakh on the night of 15th June 2020. One Commanding Officer and two jawans of the Indian Army lost their lives during a violent face-off with Chinese troops in the Galwan area of Eastern Ladakh. These are the first combat deaths on the disputed boundary since 1975. In total, 2o Indian soldiers were martyred in the clashes. Indian Army had given a befitting reply to the Chinese Army and as per different Indian media reports, the Chinese Army lost a substantial number of soldiers in the ensuing conflict.
• Following a high-level visit by commanding officers of both the Indian and Chinese forces, the Chinese army on June 9th, 2020 agreed to withdraw about 2-2.5 km away from the disputed territory, with the Indian army also agreeing to disengage at some locations. Talks for further disengagement are to continue in the coming days.
• In the initial weeks of June 2020, there was a substantial buildup of troops on both sides of the LAC, with both the Indian and Chinese army matching strength for strength
• On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu La, Sikkim (India). 11 soldiers were injured. Following the skirmishes in Sikkim, tensions between the two countries grew in Ladakh with a buildup of troops at multiple locations.

• On 11 October 2019, Chinese president Xi Jinping met with Indian prime minister Narendra Modi at Mahabalipuram, Tamil Nadu, India for a second informal meeting between India and China.
• In 2019, India reiterated that it would not join One Belt One Road initiative, stating that it cannot accept a project that ignores concerns about its territorial integrity.
• In May 2018, the two countries agreed to coordinate their development programs in Afghanistan in the areas of health, education, and food security.
• On 18 June 2017, around 270 Indian troops, with weapons and two bulldozers, entered Doklam to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the road. Among other charges, China accused India of illegal intrusion into its territory, across what is called the mutually agreed China-India boundary, and violation of its territorial sovereignty and United Nations Charter.
• On 28 August 2017, China and India reached a consensus to put an end to the border stand-off. Both of them agreed to disengage from the standoff in Doklam.
• On 16 June 2017 Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India’s ally Bhutan.
• In September 2014 the relationship became strained as troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly entered two kilometers inside the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Chumar sector. The next month, V. K. Singh said that China and India had come to an “agreement of views” on the threat of terrorism emanating from Pakistan.

Read about  Silk Road Economic Belt  in the linked article.

Background of India-China Relations

• Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited India in June 1954 and Prime Minister Nehru visited China in October 1954. Premier Zhou Enlai again visited India in January 1957 and in April 1960.
• The Sino-Indian conflict, which took place from  October 20 in 1962 led to a serious setback in bilateral relations. India and China restored ambassadorial relations in August 1976.
• Higher political level contacts were revived by the visit of the then External Affairs Minister, A.B. Vajpayee in February 1979.
• The Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua paid a return visit to India in June 1981. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in December 1988. During this visit, both sides agreed to develop and expand bilateral relations in all fields. It was also agreed to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) – to seek a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable solution on the boundary question – and a Joint Economic Group (JEG).
• From the Chinese side, Premier Li Peng visited India in December 1991. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited China in September 1993. The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India – China Border Area was signed during this visit, providing for both sides to respect the status quo on the border, clarify the LAC where there are doubts and undertake CBMs.
• President R. Venkataraman paid a state visit to China in May 1992. This was the first Head of State-level visit from India to China.
• President Jiang Zemin’s state visit to India in November 1996 was similarly the first by a PRC Head of State to India. The four agreements signed during his visit included the one on CBMs in the Military Field along the LAC covering the adoption of concrete measures between the two militaries to enhance exchanges and to promote cooperation and trust.
• India-China political relations are enhanced and strengthened by various mechanisms. There is a close and regular interaction between strategic and foreign policy think-tanks.

To know more about the  major boundary lines of the world , visit the linked article.

Relations After Nuclear Test

From the context of India-China, read the related articles linked below, for UPSC 2024 :

Indian Companies in China

With the growth in bilateral trade between India and China in the last few years, many Indian companies have started setting up Chinese operations to service both their Indian and MNC clientele in China. Indian enterprises operating in China either as representative offices, Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprises or Joint Ventures with Chinese companies are into manufacturing (pharmaceuticals, refractories, laminated tubes, auto-components, wind energy, etc.), IT and IT-enabled services (including IT education, software solutions, and specific software products), trading, banking, and allied activities.

While the Indian trading community is primarily confined to major port cities such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen, they are also present in large numbers in places where the Chinese have set up warehouses and wholesale markets such as Yiwu. Most of the Indian companies have a presence in Shanghai, which is China’s financial center; while a few Indian companies have set up offices in the capital city of Beijing. Some of the prominent Indian companies in China include Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Aurobindo Pharma, Matrix Pharma, NIIT, Bharat Forge, Infosys, TCS, APTECH, Wipro, Mahindra Satyam, Essel Packaging, Suzlon Energy, Reliance Industries, SUNDARAM Fasteners, Mahindra & Mahindra, TATA Sons, Binani Cements, etc. In the field of banking, ten Indian banks have set up operations in China. State Bank of India (Shanghai), Bank of India (Shenzhen), Canara Bank (Shanghai) and Bank of Baroda (Guangzhou), have branch offices, while others (Punjab National Banks, UCO Bank, Allahabad Bank, Indian Overseas Bank, Union Bank of India, etc.) have representative offices. Apart from PSU banks, private banks such as Axis, ICICI also has representative offices in China.

Chinese Companies in India

According to information available with the Embassy of India, close to 100 Chinese companies have established offices/operations in India. Many large Chinese state-owned companies in the field of machinery and infrastructure construction have won projects in India and have opened project offices in India. These include Sinosteel, Shougang International, Baoshan Iron & Steel Ltd, Sany Heavy Industry Ltd, Chongqing Lifan Industry Ltd, China Dongfang International, Sino Hydro Corporation, etc. Many Chinese electronic, IT, and hardware manufacturing companies also have operations in India. These include Huawei Technologies, ZTE, TCL, Haier, etc. A large number of Chinese companies are involved in EPC projects in the Power Sector.

These include Shanghai Electric, Harbin Electric, Dongfang Electric, Shenyang Electric etc. Chinese automobile major Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation (BAIC) has recently announced plans to invest US$ 250 million in an auto plant in Pune. TBEA a Xinjiang-based transformer manufacturer has firmed up plans to invest in a manufacturing facility in Gujarat. During the visit of Premier Wen to India, Huawei announced plans to invest in a telecom equipment manufacturing facility in Chennai.

India-China economic relations constitute an important element of the strategic and cooperative partnership between the two countries. Several institutional mechanisms have been established for enhancing and strengthening economic cooperation between the two countries. Besides the India-China Joint Economic Group on Economic Relations and Trade, Science and Technology (JEG), and the India-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED), a Financial Dialogue has also been taking place between the two countries since 2006.

India-China Financial Dialogue

In accordance with the MoU on the Launch of the Financial Dialogue between India and China, signed during Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005, the two sides have since successfully held Financial Dialogues. A Joint Statement was signed and released at the end of the Dialogue. During the Dialogue, both sides exchanged views on the global macroeconomic situation and policy responses, with specific reference to current risks to the global economy and the role of India and China in the post-crisis recovery phase. Discussions also took place on G20 issues including reforms in the International Monetary System and the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth.

To know about the types of monetary systems , visit the linked article.

Banking Links

Many Indian banks have established their presence in mainland China in the last few years. Four Indian banks, namely, State Bank of India (Shanghai), Canara Bank (Shanghai), Bank of Baroda (Guangzhou), and Bank of India (Shenzhen) have to branch offices in China. At present, the State Bank of India is the only Indian bank to have the authorization to conduct local currency (RMB) business at its branch in Shanghai. More Indian banks are planning to upgrade their Representative Offices in China to branch offices and existing branch offices are applying for RMB license. Various Government institutions and agencies from the two countries have also been interacting with each other for furthering cooperation in areas such as taxation, human resource development, and employment, health, urban development, and tourism. There are a close exchange and interaction between the economic think tanks and scholars as well.

Chinese President XI Jinping’s Visit (In September 2014)

China’s President Xi Jinping’s visit to India will go down history in five major aspects.

Result of the visit

• Annual Visits at the level of heads of State/Govt.
• A city in each country identified for a smart city demonstration project
• Increase speed on the existing line from Chennai to Mysore via Bangalore
• Training in a heavy haul for 100 Indian Railways officials
• Redevelopment of existing railway stations and establishment of a railway university in India
• 2015 as the ‘Visit India Year’ in China and 2016 as the ‘Visit China Year’ in India
• Promoting tourism products and routes in India based on the historical travels of the Chinese-monk scholar Xuan Zang to India in the 7th century AD
• China would be a partner country at the Delhi International Book Fair 2016
• China would be a guest country at the Indian International Film Festival 2014
• Strengthen exchanges in movies, broadcasting and television shows
• The first round of maritime cooperation dialogue to be held this year.

For more articles related to India’s foreign affairs, click on the links given in the table below:

Leave a Comment Cancel reply

Your Mobile number and Email id will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Request OTP on Voice Call

Post My Comment

Great work By BYJUS

IAS 2024 - Your dream can come true!

Download the ultimate guide to upsc cse preparation, register with byju's & download free pdfs, register with byju's & watch live videos.

India-China relations at ‘most difficult phase in 30-40 years’

The two Asian giants have been deadlocked over the border in the Himalayan region of Ladakh since June this year.

New Delhi, India – Relations between India and China are at the “most difficult phase” in the last three to four decades, India’s external affairs minister has said, as the months-long impasse over the border in the Himalayan region of Ladakh continues.

Tensions between India and China have run high since June when at least 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a violent face-off with Chinese troops involving rocks and clubs.

Keep reading

Indian jets fly over galwan as china again blames india for clash, india-china border talks: four things you should know, india, china hold talks amid ‘volatile’ border situation.

China did not release the number of casualties on its side.

Both countries have accused each other of intruding across the loosely demarcated border, known as Line of Actual Control (LAC).

“We are today probably at the most difficult phase of our relationship with China, certainly in the last 30 to 40 years,” Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said on Wednesday during a virtual session by Australian think-tank the Lowy Institute.

“We could argue even more. The last time there were military casualties on our borders was in 1975, so just to give you a sense of a time there.”

Jaishankar said that since 1988, relations between India and China have had problems but were moving in a positive direction.

He said while the two countries were taking their time to solve the boundary question, there was an understanding that they will maintain “peace and tranquillity” along the border, saying the two countries had multiple agreements that ask both parties not to bring large forces to the boundary.

“Now for some reason, for which the Chinese have given us five different explanations, the Chinese have violated it,” he said. “The Chinese have literally brought tens of thousands of soldiers in full military preparation mode right up to the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh. Naturally, the relationship would be profoundly disturbed by this,” he said.

Months-long tension

Thousands of troops from both sides have been locked in a confrontation, particularly in Ladakh, since minor skirmishes were earlier reported in late April.

Several rounds of talks have been held at the military and the diplomatic level but have failed to resolve the border standoff.

“Based on the implementation of current consensus, we will have consultations to determine specific arrangements for further talks,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said on Tuesday.

Former Indian diplomat and foreign policy analyst, Phunchok Stobdan, told Al Jazeera that Jaishankar’s comments illustrate how the relationship between the two countries has been damaged and if China wants to move ahead, the border issue has to be resolved.

“What he [India’s external affairs minister] is trying to say is that everything is not normal. Unless the border issue is resolved, things cannot be normalised,” said Stobdan.

The minister’s comments are also clearly pointing to the fact that the relations are “indeed at a point of crisis”, according to Alka Acharya, Chinese studies professor at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University’s Centre for East Asian Studies.

Jaishankar has clearly expressed his “misgivings about the way in which the relationship has now come to a point of a very serious attention”, Acharya added.

“Although efforts are still going on things are looking very difficult,” she said, adding that a resolution will work “only when we will agree on each other’s strategic interests”.

Andy Mok, a senior research fellow at the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization, told Al Jazeera: “China-India ties are indeed facing a challenging time but this is mainly caused by efforts to manipulate India into an alliance against China.”

“It would be unfortunate if it were beguiled into such a new strategic posture since this would negatively impact India as well as regional stability and prosperity. India has much more to gain by working with China and not against it.”

India-China Relations

Introduction: India-China relations have long been complex and multifaceted, characterized by a combination of cooperation, competition, and border disputes. The two Asian giants, with their vast populations, economies, and regional influence, share a significant border and have a history of diplomatic engagements, trade ties, and occasional tensions. The border disputes, particularly in the Western and Eastern sectors, have been a major point of contention, leading to military standoffs and occasional clashes.

Border Dispute

• Traditional Boundaries: The Himalayas historically acted as a natural boundary between India and China.
• Line of Actual Control (LAC): The disputed 3488 km border is separated by the LAC, which was established after the 1962 war.
• Border in Different Sectors : The border spans across four Indian states and two union territories, with different sectors having varying levels of disputes.

Reasons for Unresolved Border Disputes

• Geographical Constraints: The difficult terrain, harsh climate, and complex topography make it challenging to demarcate the border accurately.
• Cartographic Issues: British-era agreements and maps have left many areas unmarked or arbitrarily marked, leading to conflicting claims.
• Pressure Tactics: China's use of the border dispute as a pressure tactic and its timing of aggression in response to certain events.
• China-Pakistan Relations : China's reluctance to settle border disputes with India due to its close ties with Pakistan and implications for the Kashmir region.
• Lack of Trust: Differences in long-term regional aspirations and lack of mutual trust hinder cooperation and resolution.
• Other Contentious Issues : Divergent stances on Tibet, Kashmir, and other global forums, as well as nationalist sentiments, contribute to the complexity.

India's Measures in Border Areas

• Infrastructure Development: India has invested in critical border infrastructure, including strategic roads, bridges, and communication networks.
• Strengthening Border Forces: Deployment of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and the induction of Rafale jets to enhance border security.
• International Cooperation: Collaborating with Japan and promoting connectivity projects in the Northeast region to counter Chinese influence.

Bilateral Trade

• Increasing Deficit: The trade deficit for 2021-22 reached $73.31 billion, with imports at $60.27 billion and exports at $8.77 billion.
• Growth in Bilateral Trade: Annual two-way trade exceeded $100 billion in 2021, with India's imports accounting for the majority.
• Background of Trade Ties: Trade between India and China surged since the early 2000s, driven by Indian imports of Chinese machinery and equipment.
• Dependency on Chinese Goods : Significant imports from China in machinery, organic chemicals, automotive parts, and fertilizers, integrating China into India's manufacturing supply chain.  
• Active pharmaceutical ingredients, auto components, and a large number of medical supplies (since 2020) are other notable imports.
• India's Export to China: China is a major destination for Indian exports, ranking third, but India's share in China's total exports is relatively low. Over the past two years, Indian exports to China have witnessed a remarkable growth rate of over 50%.
• However, the majority of these exports comprise raw commodities such as ores, cotton, and seafood, rather than finished goods.

• The economic relations between India and China have undergone significant changes in the past two years.
• New Delhi has emphasized that it cannot be business as usual while tensions persist along the border. As a result, tighter restrictions have led to a decline in Chinese investment in India.
• Chinese investment in technology and telecommunications start-ups have come to a halt. Prohibitions on 200 apps and restrictions on Chinese firms' participation in 5G trials have been imposed.
• Increased scrutiny of Chinese firm, including tax investigations on companies like Xiaomi, has been initiated by India.
• New Delhi is contemplating a long-term plan to reduce import reliance and identified 12 sectors to boost India's global supplier status and reduce import bill.

Considerations and Implications

• View on Trade Deficit: Trade deficits/surpluses are not direct indicators of a weaker or stronger domestic economy.
• Interconnected Trade Dependencies: India's trade imbalance with China should be viewed in the context of interdependencies, such as imports of ingredients for pharmaceuticals and growing seafood exports to China.
• Challenges of Persistent Trade Deficits: Concerns about foreign exchange reserves availability and the need to enhance domestic production capacity.

India’s Trade War with China 

• Negative Consequences: Banning trade with China would primarily harm the Indian poor, punish Indian producers and exporters, and negatively impact sectors like pharmaceuticals.
• Limited Impact on China: A ban on trade with China would have minimal repercussions for China's overall trade, while hurting India's economy.
• Broader Engagement : India's integration with Chinese investments in technology startups and the importance of maintaining policy credibility and attracting foreign investment.
• Trade War and Border Dispute: Turning a border dispute into a trade war is unlikely to resolve the underlying issues, and it would disproportionately harm India.

Way forward

• Diplomatic Engagement: Maintain regular high-level meetings and negotiations to address issues and build trust.
• Border Management: Strengthen border management mechanisms to prevent tensions and ensure peace and stability.
• Economic Cooperation with Caution: Balance economic cooperation while protecting domestic industries and reducing dependence on Chinese imports.
• Enhancing Strategic Alliances: Strengthen partnerships with like-minded countries to balance China's influence and promote regional stability.
• Defense Preparedness: Strengthen defense capabilities to protect national interests and maintain deterrence.
• Political Consultations for Peaceful Resolution: Political commitment and mutual dialogue are essential for resolving border disputes between India and China.
• Military Communication: Maintaining effective military-to-military communication can help prevent and resolve border-related issues, ensuring peace and tranquility.

Answer our survey to get FREE CONTENT

Feel free to get in touch! We will get back to you shortly

• Privacy Policy
• Terms of Service
• Quality Enrichment Program (QEP)
• Intensive News Analysis (INA)
• Topper's UPSC PYQ Answer
• Essay Enrichment Program
• PSIR Optional
• NEEV GS + CSAT Foundation
• News-CRUX-10
• Daily Headlines
• Geo. Optional Monthly Editorials
• Past Papers
• © Copyright 2024 - theIAShub

Talk To Our Counsellor

India China Relations Essay | Essay on India China Relations for Students and Children in English

India China Relations Essay: China and India are two powerful countries in Asia, And These are the two most populous countries and amongst the fastest developing important economies in the World.

The tone of the relationship has varied over time; the two international locations have sought economic cooperation with each other, while time-honored border disputes and economic nationalism in both international locations are the foremost factors of contention.

You can also find more  Essay Writing  articles on events, persons, sports, technology and many more.

Long and Short Essays on India China Relations for Students and Kids in English

We are providing essay samples on a long essay on India China Relations of 500 words and a short essay on India China Relations150 words on the topic of India China Relations for reference.

Long Essay on India China Relations Essay 500 Words in English

Long Essay on India China Relations Essay is usually given to classes 7, 8, 9, and 10.

Looking around the World, the relationship between India and China is now all the hottest topics to discuss. The relationship between India and China is also called Sino-Indian relations or Indian–Chinese relations, which refers to the bilateral relationship between India and China.

Relations between contemporary China and India have been characterised by border disputes, resulting in some military conflicts. The first one is Sino- Indian War of 1962. The Sino-Indian War, also known as the Indo-China War and Sino-Indian Border Conflict, A Chinese disputed Himalayan border was the main cause of the war. After that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai drew the LAC (Line of Actual Control) in 1959.

The second one is Nathu La and Cho la incident in 1967. It was a series of military clashes between India and China alongside the border of the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, According to Independent sources, India achieved a “decisive tactical advantage” and managed to hold its own against Chinese forces. According to the Chinese claims, the number of soldiers killed was 32 on the Chinese side and 65 on the Indian side in the Nathu La incident; and 36 Indian soldiers and an ‘unknown number of Chinese were killed in the Cho La incident.

Then just after 20 years, In 1986, a military standoff took place between India and China in the Sumdorong Chu Valley bordering the Tawang district, Arunachal Pradesh and Cona County, Tibet. It was initiated by China moving a company of troops to Wangdung, a pasture to the south of Sumdorong Chu that India believed to be its territory. The standoff was the first military confrontation along the disputed McMahon Line after the 1962 warfare and gave rise to fears of escalation.

In the end, both India and China realised the danger of inadvertent conflict, and after initial posturing, they thought to de-escalate their deployments. The standoff ended with the status quo maintained.

But this is not the end. In early 2017, the two countries clashed at the Doklam plateau along the disputed Sino-Bhutanese border. However, since the late 1980s, both countries have successfully rebuilt diplomatic and economic ties.

Now Both countries have steadily established military infrastructure along with border areas including amidst the 2020 China-India skirmishes( these are part of an ongoing military standoff between China and India.)

This year, again, on 15th June 2020, a lethal military conflict over disputed territory in the Himalayas shook the edifice of China-India relations.

And still, this confrontation series is happening.

Other than The first records of contact between China and India was written during the 2nd century BCE. Buddhism was transmitted from India to China in the 1st century CE. At that time, Trade relations via the Silk Road acted as economic contact between the two regions. They had strong contact before the transmission of Buddhism. In Epic Mahabharat, those references can be found.

Now we can highlight the economic relationship between India and China. China is the biggest trading partner of India. India mostly imports electrical machinery, cell phones, heavy machinery, telecom, power, plastic toys. And China imports organic chemicals, mineral fuels, cotton, ores, plastic items, nuclear machinery, fish, salts, electrical machinery and iron and steel from India.

Recently, after occurring the Ladakh confrontation series attack, current Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, banned 49 Chinese apps. Indian citizens are now trying to boycott all Chinese products after learning consequences.

Short Essay on India China Relations Essay 150 Words in English

Short Essay on India China Relations is usually given to classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

In July 2020, Current Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi banned 49 apps. Now, this number is 118. If we want to know the background of this step, we need to know about the relationship between India and China.

India and China are the most powerful developing region in Asia. We can define relations between China and India by the events of border disputes; They had Sino-Indian War in 1962. In this war, China was victorious over India. After Sino – Indian war, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese Prime Minister of that time, Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai drew the LAC (Line of Actual Control) in 1959.

In 1967, Nathu La and Cho la incident happened. The incidents were several attacks from China. In this incident, 65 Indian soldiers and 35 Chinese soldiers died.

After those attacks, the bitterness of the relationship increased. After 2007 China became one of a powerful countries in the World. Many terrorist groups provoked China to attack LAC. These were some confronts from 2017 to 2020.

India and China now only have some economic relationships. But after having these consequences now, India is trying to cut the tie with China. And Indian citizens are now rigid to boycott every Chinese thing.

10 Lines on India China Relations Essay in English

• India and China are the most powerful developing countries in Asia.
• China is the biggest trading partner of India.
• India faces a trade imbalance heavily in favour of China.
• In 1959, India and China drew the imaginary LAC.
• The warfares between India and China are the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Nathu La and Cho la incident in 1967, and some attacks from 2017 to 2020.
• There are roughly 800 Chinese companies in the Indian domestic market.
• In 2020, China had the largest active-duty military force in the World, with about 2.18 million active military personnel.
• On 11th May 2020, a clash took place between India and China. Several soldiers on both sides had sustained injuries.
• The current Indian Prime Minister banned 49 Chinese apps.
• China still wants to create a battle tension at LAC and border skirmishes.

FAQ’s on India China Relations Essay

Question 1. Does China import anything from India?

Answer: China imports organic chemicals, mineral fuels, cotton, ores, plastic items, nuclear machinery, fish, salts, electrical machinery and iron and steel from India.

Question 2. What India Imports from China?

Answer: India imports electrical machinery, cell phones, heavy machinery, telecom, power, plastic toys and critical pharma ingredients, furniture, pharma, fertiliser, food, and textiles, etc. from China.

Question 3. What is LAC Ladakh?

Answer: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is an imaginary demarcation line that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory in the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Question 4. Is the iPhone made in China?

Answer: Apple products are assembled in China.

Balance is Beneficial Essay | Essay on Balance is Beneficial for Students and Children in English

Feminism Essay | Essay on Feminism for Students and Children in English

Father’s Day Essay | Essay on Fathers Day for Students and Children in English

My Father Essay | Essay On My Father My Role Model for Students and Children

Conversation Between Teacher and Student in English | Simple Conversations Between…

English Conversation Between Doctor and Patient in Four Simple Scenarios

Conversation Between Two Friends After a Long Time, About Pollution and Study

Advantages and Disadvantages Essay Topics for Students, IELTS & Learners

Fixed Exchange Rate Advantages And Disadvantages | What are the Major Advantages And…

Positive Words that Start With F | List of 48 Positive Words Starting With F Pictures…

Advantages And Disadvantages Of Entrepreneurship | What is Entrepreneurship?, Pros…

Comments are closed.

Welcome, Login to your account.

Recover your password.

A password will be e-mailed to you.

Unmasking the Narrative: Is China’s Debt Trap Diplomacy Fact or Fiction?

Debt Trap Diplomacy (DTD) refers to a scenario in International Relations where countries with a powerful economic position and enormous finances provide loans to relatively less endowed developing countries for inefficient or vanity projects. Subsequently, this traps the less endowed country in huge debts and holds leverage over them if they are unable to repay that debt (Onyango, 2021). DTD has gained considerable notoriety in international politics as a tool of Chinese foreign policy under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to arm-twist nations into giving forced sovereign concessions. This narrative is in part forwarded by the USA and other Western Countries as they see Chinese loans as a challenge to the current world order dominated by Western financial institutions and rules. For instance, in November 2023, US President Joe Biden hosted the America Partnership for Economic Prosperity Leaders’ Summit, and he declared that the US would provide “a real alternative to Chinese DTD with high-quality infrastructure development” (Eric Martin and Justin Sink, 2023). Meanwhile, the Philippines and Italy, the only G-7 members to participate in BRI, have recently withdrawn from the initiative out of fear of a Chinese debt trap (Times Now, 2023).

As DTD has become an international issue, this essay aims to analyse the underlying assumptions being made to dub Chinese loans “debt traps” or “predatory”. Further, the essay will use empirical examples to argue that the DTD is fiction. The mere gaining of favourable terms for investment in exchange for financial assistance cannot be dubbed DTD. The essay will analyse two case countries that were chosen based on their participation in BRI and the high share of foreign debt owed to China. These are Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Buchholz, 2023). To ascertain if the Chinese DTD is fact or fiction, the loans made by China will be analysed using criteria that are loosely based on conditions used by Michael Himmer & Zdenek Rod (Himmer and Rod, 2023, p. 254). But unlike their four criteria, this essay will narrowly define them into the following three questions: 1) Is there a clear “intent” present in Chinese debt conditions that point to an eventual debt-for-equity exchange? 2) If a debt-for-equity swap has taken place, what conditionalities govern it? 3) Has China restructured the debt of its borrower country regardless of its economic health?

For this essay, debt-for-equity or sovereign concessions would entail any infrastructural exchange that allows the Chinese government to increase its comprehensive national power, as defined by Wuttikorn Chuwattananurak (2016, p. 3), like gaining a strategically located seaport or a crucial diplomatic sway in favour of its interest. This essay will take into account the nuances that govern international finance and hence would not dub mere increase in diplomatic influence in exchange for debt as DTD. Every nation in the world gains some influence in exchange for financial support to a borrower country. DTD will stand out based on the clear intent of the Chinese nation to trap a nation in debt and gain strategic assets or debt-for-equity in return; the intent would be measured as China’s willingness to restructure debt and provide concessions. Thus, the structure of the essay would be such that, first, it will analyse why Chinese loans are seen as predatory, followed by the critical analysis of the “predatory” or “DTD” narrative through the role of agency, inherent biases, etc. This would then be followed by two case countries taken based on, one being touted as the quintessential example of DTD while the other is seen as the potential DTD victim, i.e., Sri Lanka and Pakistan, respectively. Lastly, I will conclude by giving a definitive stand on why DTD is fiction and not a fact.

Why are Chinese loans seen as predatory?

According to Brahma Chellaney (2017), providing loans to economically unstable nations for infrastructural development in itself is not wrong, but China uses its financial capacity with intent to gain control over the borrower country’s strategic assets such as natural resources, ports, and trade concessions. Therefore, he claims that China practices predatory behaviour in its lending (Himmer and Rod, 2023, p. 252). The claim that Chinese loans are predatory further stems from the secrecy China demands concerning the contractual conditions it attaches to its lending. This secrecy is amplified by China giving loans to highly fragile developing countries with corrupt governments and inefficient economies. However, it misses the point that developing countries need the most loans. A recent report analysed the 100 debt contracts from more than 2000 loan agreements signed between Chinese state-owned lenders and developing countries. It pointed out that of 100 debt contracts analysed, 47% of them were with African nations (Anna Gelpern et al., 2021, p. 4). Many of these also rank very high in the Fragile State Index. Unlike Western nations, which generally provide indirect loans through multilateral institutions like the World Bank and IMF for infrastructure development and Balance of payment crisis, respectively, China predominantly provides commercial development loans, particularly for BRI, through its state institutions like the Export-Import Bank of China and the Chinese Development Bank. Out of the 100 debt contracts signed between 2000-2020, 84 were accounted for by just the former two Chinese state banks. These contracts contained a clause that prohibits the borrower country from disclosing the conditions (Anna Gelpern et al., 2021, p. 4).  This paints a picture of China deliberately pursuing an ambiguous lending policy akin to that of a commercial bank and building a dependency between itself and the borrower country. DTD proponents argue that while international financial institutions consider the country’s infrastructural needs, economic health and human rights records, China provides loans for vanity projects with little to no economic output (Mlambo, 2022, p. 2). Further, the loans made by China for BRI projects are carried out by Chinese companies and predominantly employ Chinese workers. This gives the impression that China aims to provide minimal economic opportunity to the borrower country to repay the loan and, thus, subsequently, trap it in DTD (Anna Gelpern et al., 2021, pp. 4-9).

Problematising the predatory assumption

Agency of borrower countries

The DTD argument, although compelling, overlooks some critical aspects. The quoted report itself points out that China agrees that confidentiality obligations and loan agreements will be subordinate to the national law of the borrower country (Lynch et al., 2021). This provides a key level of agency to the borrower country, which the report and the larger DTD debate do not give sufficient importance to. Also, the DTD debate often takes the borrower country as not having any influence on the loan conditions it accepts or infrastructural projects it requires. The entire transaction is portrayed as unidirectional, with only China deciding what to build and its financial conditions. This is not the case; the recipient country plays a decisive role in the projects that would be financed with China as an advisor and financier. As Jones and Hameiri point out in their research, China cannot and does not dictate unilaterally what is built under the BRI project using its finances; instead, the borrower countries play the quintessential role in determining which infrastructural projects they want China to finance and build (Jones and Hameiri, 2020, pp. 2-4). The unique thing about Chinese development financing is its recipient-driven approach to projects with Chinese as advisors, and this distinguishes Chinese financial assistance from traditional Western financiers, giving more agency to borrower countries. Therefore, it is natural for borrower countries to only support those infrastructure projects that serve their national interest (Jones and Hameiri, 2020, pp. 10-12). This negates the DTD argument of China forcing borrower countries to accept lopsided agreements that may result in debt-for-equity in future. Further, as mentioned, the loan conditions, although opaque, are subordinate to national law; thus, anything that is against national interest would undoubtedly be unacceptable to the borrower country.

This can be enumerated in the case of Djibouti, whose public debt in 2016-17 had risen to 80% of GDP, of which the lion’s share was owed to China. Some scholars like Mark Green argued that China had forced Djibouti into letting it open its first foreign military base there in exchange for restructuring the debt (Green, 2019). But this misses the point that there are many other foreign military bases in Djibouti, including that of the USA, France, and Italy, all of whom have given substantial financial assistance to the country. The USA invested over $338 million in Djibouti between 2001 and 2020, with over $89 million in 2007 also (U.S. Embassy in Djibouti, 2020). Interestingly, in January 2007, the US and Djibouti signed an agreement that hitherto 88 acres of Camp Lemonnier base would be expanded to 500 acres, and it would be put under the separate US African Command while giving liberty to the US to allow its allies to use the base as well (U.S. Navy, 2024). This can be seen as the US extracting concessions in exchange for financial support, but hardly anyone would dub this as DTD. It can be instead seen through the lens of a unique foreign policy of Djibouti, under which it uses foreign military bases as a source of stability and revenue for its domestic economy (Reel, 2016), pointing towards the agency the country poses in its dealings with global power. In allowing China to build a military base, both nations have signed a 10-year lease agreement that is a $20 million per year payment to Djibouti’s government (Congressional Research Service, 2019). Providing a vital source of revenue for a developing country with limited revenue streams.

The case of Djibouti points to the borrower countries agency regarding financial assistance from great powers like China and the USA, which further points towards the hedging capacity these countries have to extract the best possible agreements from great powers. This negates the DTD argument that claims China arm-twists the nation into signing an ambiguous loan agreement and then forces them to concede strategic assets. This is not to say that financial assistance did not play a favourable role for China in gaining access to a military base in Djibouti. Still, an overt intention of DTD is absent. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to China’s concerted aim to provide financial assistance in the hope of receiving a strategic asset.

Prejudicial lens

The DTD argument partially stems from biases that China should follow the lending practices of the West not to be considered predatory. This narrative has been forwarded by the West, but the opaque terms and conditions of the loans given by China make it more believable. Some of these opaque conditions, which are general to all lending contracts by China Development Bank and China EXIM bank, include the cross-default clause, which entitles these state-run institutions to terminate and demand immediate full repayment when the borrower country defaults on loan repayment to any of its other lenders. Chief among them would be the Paris Club and international financial institutions. Approximately three-quarters of the debt contracts analysed by the How China Lends report contain a “No Paris Club” Clause, which expressly commits the borrower country to exclude the debt restructuring initiative taken by the multilateral Paris Club and keep Chinese debt restructuring negotiations limited to bilateral talks (Gelpern et al., 2021, pp. 6-7).

Although the contractual agreements do have high ambiguity, as was previously mentioned, all the lending conditions are subordinate to the national law of the borrower country. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that no borrower nation would have in its constitution or similar law of the land a provision that allows the exchange of a strategic asset like a seaport in exchange for debt relief by China. In fact, the only known case of strategic asset transfer to China, other than the infamous Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, was in Tajikistan in 2011, when the Government of Tajikistan ceded 1,158 square km of land to China, although there is limited information on the background conditions for the transfer (Niewenhuis, 2019). Some scholars believe it was due to a historical border dispute rather than a debt-for-equity exchange.

Besides the dearth of anecdotal evidence for debt-for-equity transfer, most of the rhetoric against Chinese debt has come from Western nations and not the Global South, which is the largest recipient of the said debt and is supposedly the target of DTD. Since 2018, the United States has been the main narrative builder of DTD: in the summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy report of the USA, it was stated that China practices “Debt-Trap Diplomacy” and “predatory economics to coerce nations” (US Department of Defense, 2018, pp. 1-3; Xu and Li, 2020, p. 72). However, there is little to no official record of developing nations using the DTD narrative to describe the Chinese financial assistance. This points to the prevalence of a notion that Global South nations do not share the Western perspective of seeing Chinese financial assistance as debt-trap diplomacy. In fact, as the case of Djibouti showed and subsequent examples will further corroborate, Chinese financial assistance is seen as a viable alternative by developing countries (Mlambo, 2022, pp. 2-3) to stringent conditions demanded by Western financial institutions. Thus, DTD remains a fiction for much of the developing South.

Missing intent for DTD

There is a lack of evidence of China’s clear intent to trap the borrowing nations into a debt-for-equity agreement. Gaining diplomatic clout and favourable terms of trade are not enough to justify a DTD argument because this is ubiquitous to all foreign investments, loans and aid provided by countries around the world. Therefore, a clear intent to entrap the borrower country in a near future debt-for-equity agreement is essential for Chinese financial assistance to be dubbed as DTD (Himmer and Rod, 2023, pp. 252-254). China’s lack of intent on DTD can be enumerated in the case of Zambia, which defaulted on its foreign debt repayment in 2020. At the end of 2022, Zambia owed China EXIM Bank $4.1 billion and another $1.8 billion to other Chinese lenders (Mfula, 2024). Since then, China, along with other international lenders under G20 Common Framework Process, has agreed to restructure the debt. Under the restructuring agreement, international lenders, including China, agreed to forego approximately $840 million of their claims (Do Rosario and Strohecker, 2024). This exemplifies China’s propensity to restructure the debt of troubled lenders instead of taking a hawkish approach to extract debt-for-equity concessions from its borrowers. However, this is not to say that China is willing to restructure debt in all cases because a large share of China’s government revenue is derived from debt-servicing payments due to its status as a leading provider of international finance. This is why China prefers lengthy extensions on debt repayment with marginal interest rates instead of an outright reduction on the principal amount. Hence, China will see Zambia pay an interest rate of as low as 1% until 2037 and push out maturities on a total of $6.3 billion in bilateral debt to 2043, representing an extension of approximately 12 years (Abeyrathne, 2023). China’s tendency to allow debt restructuring counters the DTD argument, which portrays it as a predatory lender, thus providing empirical evidence that the DTD remains a fiction.

Case Analyses

Sri Lanka and Hambantota

The case of Sri Lanka is touted by many scholars as the quintessential example of DTD owing to its overt debt-for-equity transaction in terms of a 99-year lease of Hambantota port in 2017 to Chinese company CM Port in exchange for debt relief by China of up to $1.12 billion (Gangte, 2020, p. 55; Moramudali, 2020). Sri Lanka was embroiled in a civil war in its northern region for decades, but as the war fizzled out in the late 2000s, the country needed foreign investment to kick-start its economy. Aiming to capitalise its geostrategic position, Sri Lanka started searching for foreign investors, but its proposal for the port was rejected by the US, India and Asia Development Bank; only China agreed to loan it $307 million at a 6.3% interest rate in late 2007 (Himmer and Rod, 2023, pp. 259-260). In 2012, the Sri Lankan government borrowed an additional $757 million from China Exim Bank for the port but for a much lower 2% interest rate (Jones and Hameiri, 2020, pp. 15-16). Thus, the Development of the Hambantota Port was carried out in two phases, first from 2008 to 2010, followed by the expansion of the port in 2012-2014.

The construction was jointly done by the Sri Lankan Port Authority (SLPA), China Harbour Engineering and China Merchant Port both state-operated enterprises. Although by 2014 the port had become the largest in South Asia, its cargo traffic declined year on year. By the end of 2016, the port only generated revenue of $11.8 million compared to operating expenses of $10 million (Jones and Hameiri, 2020, p. 15 ). The continuous borrowing over the past 8 years and little to no profit from the port made the interest repayment reach unsustainable levels by the end of 2014. Subsequently, Sri Lanka requested China Exim Bank to restructure the loans obtained to build Hambantota Port. However, the China Exim Bank declined to either reduce the interest rate or increase the repayment time frame as it could set a dangerous precedent for other loans (Moramudali and Panduwawala, 2022). This culminated in SLPA handing over 70% of the stake in Hambantota port to Chinese CMPort in 2017 in exchange for $1.12 billion, but the remaining 30% stake still rests with SLPA.

Overtly, this paints the picture that, indeed, China carried out DTD in the case of Sri Lanka, but essential criteria to dub it as such are missing, as Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri note in their report (Jones and Hameiri, 2020, p. 13). First, the ownership of the port still rests with Sri Lanka, which means that Chinese naval ships are not allowed to use the port without explicit permission from the Sri Lankan government. Second, the port was a commercial venture, not a geostrategic one, which created vast surplus shipping capacity but with no takers due to fraught economic conditions in Sri Lanka itself. Third, Sri Lanka’s debt distress predated the construction of the Port and related loans. Instead, it was rooted in economic mismanagement by the Sri Lankan Government itself, particularly in the commercial market loans share of its foreign debt. For instance, they made up 39% of the total foreign debt of Sri Lanka in 2017, while China accounted for only 10% of the total debt, less than what Sri Lanka owed to Japan and the Asian Development Bank (Himmer and Rod, 2023, p. 261). There is also a lack of clear evidence of “intent” on the Chinese side to trap Sri Lanka in debt-for-equity. The port construction was a Sri Lankan initiative that did not find any financiers among the international players; therefore, they turned to China, which provided the necessary finance. This does not mean China was altruistic in its lending; it, indeed, wanted to support its national interest by bringing Sri Lanka into the BRI. However, the Sri Lankan case lacks the core matrix to define it as DTD. It lacks a clear intent, and the conditions for debt-for-equity transfer were exceptions to the norms of lending, not its example. The DTD remains a fiction in this analysis. Although China does support vanity projects through BRI, it only does it at the behest of the borrower country; hence, China is no different than any other lender in the international economy in furthering its interest.

Pakistan and CPEC

The case of Pakistan is unique because of the long-running economic partnership between China and Pakistan that predates BRI, yet DTD proponents argue that it might be the next victim of Chinese predatory loans. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is part of the Southeast Asian Silk Road under the umbrella of BRI. CPEC was announced in 2015 as a flagship project of BRI that will “promote the phenomenon of development for mutual destiny” (Khan and Khan 2019, p. 68). Under CPEC, the Chinese government and its companies will invest and build projects worth $45.6 billion, ranging from energy to infrastructure. Key among them is the major transport infrastructure, the Karakorum Highway, which connects the Xinjiang province in Western China to the strategic Gwadar Port in Baluchistan. Other projects include the East Bay Expressway, Karachi-Lahore Highway and Gwadar International Airport (Khan and Khan, 2019). Pakistan needs this investment to reinforce its lacking infrastructure, which is essential to shore up its weakening economic growth. The CPEC project, once completed over the 15 years, is projected to lift Pakistan’s GDP by 15% (Ashraf, 2015). The project could act as a game changer for Pakistan, at a time when its rival India’s economy is five times greater than it. CPEC is supposed to turn it from a net importer to a regional trading hub between China and the Western world (Shaikh and Chen, 2021). The project brings benefits for China as well; most crucially, it enables it to bypass its “Malaca Dilemma”, which could choke its energy-import-dependent domestic economy if ever an adversary decided to block the Malaca Strait (Shaikh and Chen 2021, p. 2). CPEC also enables China to develop its relatively poor Xinjiang region and open a land corridor directly to the Arabian Sea through which goods can reach European Markets much faster. Additionally, Gwadar Port is a deep harbour port, which means China can dock its submarines there and use it as a strategic port for projecting power in the Indian Ocean (Boyce, 2017).  Interestingly, the military benefits of the port, like docking submarines since 2016 (Iwanek, 2019), stem from the deep military relationship between China and Pakistan and not because of the port’s location. Therefore, it cannot be termed a sovereignty concession from Pakistan in exchange for debt as both countries call each other “Iron brothers” and point towards a high level of relations (Li, 2021). Further, the mutual benefits mentioned above point to the symbiotic relationship between the two, although China benefits more from CPEC than Pakistan. However, such is ubiquitous in all economic agreements regardless of the countries involved be they Western or Eastern. China has also demonstrated considerable flexibility in providing Pakistan with debt relief and additional loans, even while suffering major terror attacks on Chinese citizens working on CPEC (Aamir, 2023). This is essential to take into account because China has all the necessary ammunition to take control of Gwadar port in a debt-for-equity transaction but has chosen not to do so. This points to the lack of DTD intent and flexibility towards its international partners, which is seldom seen in other international lenders. Hence, even with all the ammunition, China has continued to provide debt relief to Pakistan, thus pointing to the fictitious nature of the DTD argument.

DTD debate will continue to evolve as the relations between the USA and China pass through their highs and lows. The purpose of this essay is to shed light on the factual underpinnings of the DTD debate and show its fictitious nature. Although China engages in opaque loan conditions and always has an eye for its own interest, this is ubiquitous among all lender countries, regardless of whether they are Eastern or Western. Further, there exists little to no evidence to suggest China intentionally provides such loans that may result in debt-for-equity transfer by the borrower country. In fact, during the analysis of the research, it was found that Sri Lanka was given an economic lifeline by China when they defaulted in 2022. Furthermoe, before 2017, China was not the one who proposed the Hambantota Project, but it was the then Sri Lankan government led by Mahinda Rajapaksa who hastened the project and mismanaged its economy. The case of Pakistan shows that even when China had the opportunity to take over the strategic Gwadar Port in exchange for debt relief, it did not do so and even provided additional funds to Pakistan to shore up its foreign reserves. DTD stems from an inherent Western bias against China because of its political system and, on its part, China also keeps its lending practices opaque, thus lending credence to the DTD label. But the fact remains that DTD is fictitious and has no empirical evidence to support its predatory lending claim.

Aamir, A., 2023. China loaned Pakistan $21bn more than reported, study finds. Available at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/China-loaned-Pakistan-21bn-more-than-reported-study-finds [Accessed 28 April 2024].

Abeyrathne, D. H., 2023. A Tale of 3 Nations: Debt Restructuring in Ghana, Zambia, and Sri Lanka. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/a-tale-of-3-nations-debt-restructuring-in-ghana-zambia-and-sri-lanka/ [Accessed 2024 April 2024].

Ashraf, S., 2015. China link-up an opportunity and a challenge for Pakistan. Available at: https://eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/02/china-link-up-an-opportunity-and-a-challenge-for-pakistan/ [Accessed 27 April 2024].

Boyce, T., 2017. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Trade Security and Regional Implications. Available at: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1344537 [Accessed 27 April 2024].

Buchholz, K., 2023. The Countries Most in Debt to China. Available at: https://www.statista.com/chart/19642/external-loan-debt-to-china-by country/#:~:text=At%20the%20end%20of%202021,the%20biggest%20debts%20to%20China . [Accessed 27 March 2024].

Chellaney, B., 2017. China’s Creditor Imperialism. Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-sri-lanka-hambantota-port-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-12?barrier=accesspaylog [Accessed 27 March 2024].

Chellaney, B., 2017. Project Syndicate: China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy. Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01 [Accessed 16 March 2024].

Chuwattananurak, W., 2016. China’s Comprehensive National Power and Its Implications for the Rise of China: Reassessment and Challenges. Ljubljana, Slovenia, CEEISA-ISA.

Congressional Research Service, 2019. China’s Engagement in Djibouti. Available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11304 [Accessed 18 April 2024].

Do Rosario, J. and Strohecker, K., 2024. Zambia strikes preliminary deal on $3 bln international bond rework. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambia-reaches-debt-restructuring-agreement-with-bondholder-committee-2024-03-25/ [Accessed 18 April 2024].

Gangte, L., 2020. The Debt-Trap Diplomacy Revisited: A case Study on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. Journal of Social Sciences, 19 (2), pp. 53-66.

Gelpern, A. et al., 2021. How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments, Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development.

Green, M., 2019. China’s Debt Diplomacy: How Belt and Road threatens countries’ ability to achieve self-reliance. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy/ [Accessed 18 April 2024].

Himmer, M., & Rod, Z., 2022. Chinese debt trap diplomacy: Reality or myth?  Journal of the Indian Ocean Region ,  18 (3), pp. 250–272.

Iwanek, K., 2019. No, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Is Not a Chinese Naval Base (Just Yet). Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/no-pakistans-gwadar-port-is-not-a-chinese-naval-base-just-yet/ [Accessed 27 April 2024].

Jones, L. and Hameiri, S., 2020. Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt Trap Diplomacy’: How Recipient Countries Shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative, London: Chatham House.

Khan, M. Z. U., & Khan, M. M., 2019. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Challenges.  Strategic Studies ,  39 (2), 67–82. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48544300 .

Li, Q., 2021. China-Pakistan “Iron Brotherhood”: 70 Years Hand in Hand. Available at: https://www.ciis.org.cn/english/COMMENTARIES/202109/t20210908_8122.html [Accessed 28 April 2024].

Lynch, L. et al., 2021. A New Database Reveals China’s ‘Secret’ Loans? Think Again. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/a-new-database-reveals-chinas-secret-loans-think-again/ [Accessed 26 March 2024].

Martin, E. and Sink, J. 2023. Biden Jabs at China ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’ at Americas Summit: Bloomberg News. Available at: https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/biden-jabs-at-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy-at-americas-summit [Accessed 26 March 2024].

Mfula, C., 2024. Zambian officials held debt talks with Chinese banks last week. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-officials-held-debt-talks-with-chinese-banks-last-week-2024-02-02/ [Accessed 18 April 2024].

Mlambo, C., 2022. China in Africa: An Examination of the Impact of China’s Loans on Growth in Selected African States. Economies, 10 (7), 154.

Moramudali, U., 2020. The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-myths-and-realities/ [Accessed 22 April 2024].

Moramudali, U. and Panduwawala, T., 2022. Demystifying China’s Role in Sri Lanka’s Debt Restructuring. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/demystifying-chinas-role-in-sri-lankas-debt-restructuring/ [Accessed 21 April 2024].

Niewenhuis, L., 2019. The ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ debate: Are China’s loans predatory? Available at: https://thechinaproject.com/2019/09/18/the-debt-trap-diplomacy-debate-are-chinas-loans-predatory/ [Accessed 18 April 2024].

Onyango, A., 2021. Debt trap diplomacy: How financial hegemony hinders trade and development. Available at: https://www.tradefinanceglobal.com/posts/debt-trap-diplomacy-how-financial-hegemony-hinders-trade-and-development/ [Accessed 18 March 2024].

Reel, M., 2016. Djibouti Is Hot: How a forgotten sandlot of a country became a hub of international power games. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-djibouti/ [Accessed 18 April 2024].

Shaikh, R., & Chen, C.-K., 2021. China’s Debt Trap in Pakistan? A Case Study of the CPEC Project.  South Asia Research ,  41 (3), pp. 399-414.

Times Now, 2023. After Philippines, Italy Officially Pulls Out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Available at: https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/after-philippines-italy-officially-pulls-out-of-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative/ar-AA1l7gKy [Accessed 26 March 2024].

U.S. Embassy in Djibouti, 2020. U.S. Renews its Commitment to Djibouti with $9 Million Development Objective Grant Agreement. Available at: https://dj.usembassy.gov/u-s-renews-its-commitment-to-djibouti-with-9-million-development-objective-grant-agreement/ [Accessed 18 April 2024].

U.S. Navy, 2024. CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI MENU. Available at: https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/Camp-Lemonnier-Djibouti/About/History/ [Accessed 18 April 2024].

US Department of Defense, 2018. Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, s.l.: US Department of Defense.

Xu, S. and Li, J., 2020. The Emergence and Fallacy of “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy” Narrative. China International Studies, 81 , pp. 69-84.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• Beyond the Narrative of China’s Debt Trap Diplomacy
• Why Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Being Questioned by Japan and India?
• China’s Increasing Influence in the Middle East
• Why China Should Re-Strategize its Wolf Warrior Diplomacy
• China’s Instrument or Europe’s Influence? Safeguard Policies in the AIIB
• Norm-taker or Norm-shaper: Is China Socialising into Norms of Intervention?

Please Consider Donating

Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing.

E-IR is an independent non-profit publisher run by an all volunteer team. Your donations allow us to invest in new open access titles and pay our bandwidth bills to ensure we keep our existing titles free to view. Any amount, in any currency, is appreciated. Many thanks!

Donations are voluntary and not required to download the e-book - your link to download is below.

Read The Diplomat , Know The Asia-Pacific

• Central Asia
• Southeast Asia

Environment

• Asia Defense
• China Power
• Crossroads Asia
• Flashpoints
• Pacific Money
• Tokyo Report
• Trans-Pacific View

Photo Essays

• Write for Us
• Subscriptions

What China’s Strategists Think About China-US Relations

Recent features.

The Lingering Economic Consequences of Sri Lanka’s Civil War

What’s Driving Lithuania’s Challenge to China?

Hun Manet: In His Father’s Long Shadow

Afghanistan: A Nation Deprived, a Future Denied

In Photos: Life of IDPs in Myanmar’s Rakhine State

Indian Government’s Intensifying Attack on Scientific Temperament Worries Scientists

Beyond Tariffs: Unveiling the Geopolitics of Electric Vehicles Through Supply Chains

In Photos: Bangladesh After Hasina Fled

First Known Survivor of China’s Forced Organ Harvesting Speaks Out 

Nuclear Shadows Over South Asia: Strategic Instabilities in the China-India-Pakistan Triad

Securing America’s Critical Minerals: A Policy Priority Conundrum

The Geopolitics of Cambodia’s Funan Techo Canal

Interviews  |  diplomacy  |  east asia.

Yu Jie, a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House, analyzes Chinese elites’ perceptions of the bilateral relationship.

Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with U.S. President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, Nov. 14, 2022.

Over the past decade, tensions in the China-U.S. relationship have mounted to the point that many now speak of a “new cold war” between Beijing and Washington. U.S. policymakers have leaned into this dynamic, explicitly framing China as a “strategic competitor” and “America’s pacing threat.”

How do Chinese elites view the relationship?

That’s the question Dr. Yu Jie set out to answer in her new report, “ China ‘under siege’: How the US’s hardening China policy is seen in Beijing .” Yu Jie, a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House, analyzed publications, officials remarks, and private conversations with top Chinese strategists to understand how elites in China are thinking about the China-U.S. relationship.

In this email interview with The Diplomat, Yu Jie explains common trends in China’s thinking about the United States as well as hotspot issues like Taiwan and the war in Ukraine. Overall, she says, “ Beijing’s strategic community does not expect any significant improvement in the Sino-U.S. relationship before and after the U.S. elections in November 2024. ”

In 2015, veteran China scholar David Lampton famously warned of a “tipping point” in China-U.S. relations, as American perceptions of China changed dramatically. Your paper traces a similar shift in Chinese perceptions of the U.S. – and hardening of official rhetoric – in the early 2020s. What explains the delay between U.S. and Chinese re-evaluations of the basic state of their relationship?

There are three main reasons of this delay in adjusting their bilateral ties: Firstly, the Chinese political elites didn’t consider the erratic Trump administration would last beyond 2020. They hoped that the election of U.S. President Joe Biden in 2020 might herald a softening of the confrontational China policy of his predecessor. However, these hopes have been dashed as President Biden has pursued a similarly tough China policy, executed in a more sophisticated, coordinated, and substantive manner. Beijing sees clear evidence of a containment strategy in Washington.

Secondly, Chinese leaders have deprioritized the typical buffers and stabilizers of the China-U.S. relationship such as trade and investment. The tangible benefits of the China-U.S. relationship in the past, namely trade and investment, have rapidly diminished due to increased commercial competitiveness and Beijing’s decisive pivot from low-end, export-led growth to a high-end manufacturing growth model.

And lastly, the thorniest and most risk-laden issues in China-U.S. relations, such as Taiwan and South China Sea, continue to add mistrust and upset the current status quo. Beijing considers stronger deterrence actions should be absolutely necessary to send warnings to Washington and its Indo-Pacific allies.

If most Chinese strategists believe that the deterioration of China-U.S. relations is now more or less permanent, then what is Beijing’s goal regarding China-U.S. interactions? The Biden administration has repeatedly stressed the need for “guardrails” and conflict management. Is that China’s hope as well?

China’s ultimate goal is to ensure that the further erosion of China-U.S. relations does not hinder domestic economic growth, which is key to giving the ruling regime legitimacy. The overall strategy for Beijing to deal with the U.S. is to minimize damage from Washington by maximizing China’s economic and political influence in the rest of the world, most notably with large parts of the Global South. Such a move might well buy time for China to speed up its own economic resilience and technology development.

As for the phrase “guardrails,” it was hugely dismissed by the Chinese political elites. The guardrails implies someone set the rules and others to follow. However, Beijing does not only want to become the follower of rules set by the U.S. in this bilateral relationship. It asks for a significant equity in deciding the rules.

You note a strong pessimism among Chinese experts about the potential of “peaceful reunification,” with many experts arguing that Taiwan’s government would not agree to unification with the mainland absent strong coercion. Is there any introspection about why the DPP has adopted a hardline stance on China – and been re-elected to the presidency three times in a row by Taiwan’s people?

A noticeable feature from Beijing is the growing sense of urgency to deter pro-independence supporters and the sharp criticism of “separatists” inside Taiwan, as President Xi and his lieutenants have made several official comments on various occasions – particularly after Nancy Pelosi, at the time speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taipei. Both changes reflect Xi’s own belief that there has been a serious deterioration of the Sino-U.S. relationship. Related to this shift, Chinese leaders and official media use coded vocabulary, such as “external forces,” to criticize U.S. interference in matters related to Taiwan under both the Trump and Biden administrations.

Despite no formal changes of wording in Beijing’s political blueprints on Taiwan, on balance Chinese political elites and influential scholars consider the current situation to be precarious with the pro-independence DPP government in Taiwan, which is likely to result in more active Chinese deterrents to confront the Taiwanese government as well as the incoming U.S. president, irrespective of who that is.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there’s a strong sense among European analysts that China has “lost” Europe due to its support for Russia. Do Chinese strategists agree? And if so, how important is this factor for China’s national interests?

The Chinese strategic community has intensely debated the three challenges related to the war in Ukraine. The subject has raised many questions that have proven difficult to answer, including: to what extent can China support Russia and maintain stable ties with both the U.S. and Europe, while not facing secondary sanctions from the collective West? When and how will the war end? Should China play a more active mediation role between Russia and Ukraine given the current stalemate on the battlefield?

In fact, Chinese experts opinions are divided on the fundamental questions of whether China should align with Russia and what the likely repercussions would be for China’s ties with the U.S. and Europe. However, there is also a strong view among many Chinese international affairs specialists that even if Beijing sided with Europe, Europeans would not have responded in kind; and the transatlantic alliance countering China would not be weakened by China’s stances to this war. One can confirm that Beijing’s damage limitation efforts have not been well received in some European capitals.

China’s strong inclination to sustain its ties with Russia goes well beyond the Kremlin’s military adventure. Its return on investments is still framed by its response to the United States’ pursuit of a China containment strategy. Beijing believes its relations with Moscow might well bring a necessary (if imperfect) solution in dealing with U.S. policy in both economic and diplomatic terms.

How does China view the upcoming U.S. election? Is there a clear preference for either Donald Trump or Kamala Harris?

With the U.S. presidential candidates likely to compete with one another to sound tough on China, Beijing’s strategic community does not expect any significant improvement in the Sino-U.S. relationship before or after the U.S. elections in November 2024.

With the possible return of Donald Trump, Chinese leaders will likely reinforce the narrative that the U.S. is the single and most disruptive source of global instability, while portraying China as a responsible and confident world power able to stand up to the U.S. hegemony. For Beijing, the return of Donald Trump might well be a rare opportunity to recalibrate its bilateral relationship with the U.S., as he is often willing to make deals outside traditional political parameters. However, his leadership style will cause further anxiety for Chinese leaders as Trump tends to focus on his own interests regardless of the consequences, as was illustrated by the Trump administration ignoring the well-established approach of generations of U.S. and Chinese leaders to Taiwan.

On Harris, Beijing naturally considers she will continue to carry forward the Biden administration’s China policy and strengthen the United States’ influence in the Indo-Pacific. As a result, there is not a clear preference for Harris or Trump.

Why Beijing Isn’t Interested in Setting Guardrails for China-US Competition

By jinghao zhou.

Wang Peng on China-US Relations in the Xi and Trump Eras

By shannon tiezzi and juan zhang.

Parsing China’s Panda Diplomacy

By jeremiah may.

Bridging the Narrative Gap in China-US Relations

By vu le thai hoang and ngo di lan.

By Rajeev Bhattacharyya

Bangladesh’s New Democracy Under Threat From Flood of Misinformation

By farhana sultana.

An Aggressive China Is Pushing the Philippines and Vietnam Closer Than Ever

By vincent kyle parada.

By Shawn Rostker

By Devana Senanayake

By Aleksander Lust

By Markus Karbaum

By Coco Ree

Try AI-powered search

Can big food adapt to healthier diets?

It must contend with weight-loss drugs and concerns about processed foods.

B ig food , it seems, has a sweet tooth. On August 14th Mars , a packaged-food giant best known for its chocolatey fare , announced it would gobble up Kellanova, maker of Pringles and Pop-Tarts, for $36bn. It is not the only company betting big on calorific goodies. Last November Smucker’s, a purveyor of jams and peanut butters, completed its $6bn acquisition of Hostess Brands, maker of Ho Hos and Twinkies.

Filling bellies is a lucrative business. The West’s ten most valuable packaged-food and soft-drink companies have a combined market capitalisation of around $1trn. Their average operating margin last year was a plump 17%; grocers typically make just 2-4%. Consumers have continued to feast on the cheap calories served up by these firms despite the recent bout of inflation. Last year the group’s sales grew by 5%, on average. Rising demand in the developing world is bolstering growth. Around half of Coca-Cola’s revenue already comes from outside Western markets. HSBC , a bank, reckons that global food demand will increase by more than 40% between now and 2040.

Yet the industry also faces threats. The impact of its products on the health of those who consume them has long been a concern for shoppers and policymakers alike. Consumers may now indulge on them less as weight-loss drugs become cheaper and more convenient. What is more, a growing body of research suggests that it may not only be an excess of sugar, fat and salt that causes health problems, but also the heavy processing used to whip up cheap nibbles. Both are set to reshape the industry—and transform what the world ingests.

The roots of today’s food industry stretch back to 19th-century innovations such as pasteurisation and canning that helped make food plentiful, convenient and safe. Today a humble bag of crisps is manufactured in an assembly line where spuds are sliced, fried, drenched in seasoning, preservatives, and colouring agents, then sealed in a bag with nitrogen to keep them from going stale. The process takes around 30 minutes.

Such tasty products have contributed to the surge in obesity in recent decades. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, the average daily calorie intake of people in the rich world has risen by a fifth since the 1960s, to 3,500 calories, well in excess of what their bodies need. By the end of this decade nearly half the world’s population is expected to be obese or overweight.

Consumers who have found it difficult to alter their diets may at last be able to do so thanks to new blockbuster weight-loss drugs including Wegovy (from Novo Nordisk, a Danish pharmaceutical company) and Zepbound (from Eli Lilly, an American rival). For now, the hefty price tag and inconvenience of weekly injections mean only a sliver of the population in rich countries is taking these medications. But uptake is expected to rise as competition lowers prices and pill forms hit the market.

Patients taking the drugs have reported that they crave calorific food less. Analysis by Grocery Doppio, a research firm, finds that users lower their spending on groceries by 11% on average, with spending on snacks and confectionery falling by more than half. Morgan Stanley, a bank, reckons 7-9% of Americans could be taking weight-loss drugs by 2035, resulting in reductions in overall demand ranging from 3% for cereal to 5% for ice cream (see chart 1).

Big food may well take these developments in its stride. The industry has a record of launching new products that cater to weight-watching consumers. Coca-Cola first launched Diet Coke in 1982, and has released various other sugar-free alternatives since then. Most food and beverage companies now offer products with reduced sugar, fat or salt. According to Mintel, a market-research firm, the number of new health-conscious snacks launched annually rose by 2% between 2015 and 2020, compared with a decline of 1% for traditional snacks. Some companies, such as Mondelez, an American snack giant, now offer smaller portion sizes.

Indeed, a number of food companies see weight-loss drugs as an opportunity. In May Nestlé, the world’s biggest such firm, said it would launch a new frozen-food brand, Vital Pursuit, targeted at users of the drugs, who still need to ensure they get adequate quantities of protein and other nutrients despite consuming smaller quantities of food. Mark Schneider, the company’s boss, says Nestlé is already preparing for a “lower-calorie, higher-nutrient future”. Last year the business set a target of growing sales of “more nutritious” products by 50% by the end of the decade. Other packaged-food businesses such as Conagra and General Mills also now have products targeted at users of slimming jabs.

Upstarts might try to steal their lunch, but incumbents will be in a strong position to cater to consumers seeking out nutritious low-calorie options. It takes just six to nine months to develop and launch a new product, notes Mr Schneider. Deep ties with supermarkets and other retailers make it easy to get products onto shelves once they are ready. Vast marketing budgets can be deployed to raise awareness among consumers.

Food for thought

The threat from a crackdown on processed foods, if it materialises, will be trickier to deal with. In 2009 Carlos Monteiro, a Brazilian scientist, sorted food into four buckets based on the degree of processing undertaken. The first covers unprocessed items such as fruit and vegetables. The last, called ultra-processed foods ( UPF s), covers items such as breakfast cereal and crisps, as well as protein bars and fake meats, which contain significant amounts of ingredients not typically found in a home kitchen. Since the 1990s the share of UPF s in diets worldwide has been increasing. According to one study, they now account for around half of the calorie intake in America, Britain and Canada (see chart 2). Many studies have linked the consumption of large amounts of upf s to weight gain and various health issues, although some do not disentangle the effects of heavy processing from the large doses of fat, sugar and salt that are often found in these foods.

The research is nascent and not everyone is convinced. Arne Astrup, a researcher at the Novo Nordisk Foundation in Denmark, believes that the definition of UPF s is too woolly. But policymakers in some countries are already taking action. In November last year Colombia imposed a tax on a range of UPF s. Dietary guidelines in Belgium, Brazil, Canada and elsewhere recommend avoiding the products. Mr Monteiro has called for health dangers to be labelled on UPF s, as many countries have done with cigarettes.

The industry’s approach to upf s so far has ranged from scepticism to suspended judgment. Ramon Laguarta, the chief executive of PepsiCo, said in January that he doesn’t believe in the term; Mr Schneider says Nestlé is following the debate “very closely”. But the stakes are high. If pressure from governments ratchets up, then the industry will have to do more than tweak its recipes or roll out a new product line. Companies would have to overhaul their manufacturing processes. Ditching additives could make products more expensive to produce and shorten their shelf life, cutting into profits. Big food has so far managed to thrive even as concerns around consumers’ health have swirled. With upf s, it could face its most daunting challenge yet. ■

To stay on top of the biggest stories in business and technology, sign up to the Bottom Line , our weekly subscriber-only newsletter.

More from Business

The global tourism boom is shifting to Asia

Travel in the region is roaring after a difficult few years

From Taylor Swift to Star Trek, niche cruises are on the rise

Themed offerings are luring young and old

Startups are finding novel ways to recycle carbon

Demand is set to rocket as costs continue to fall

How to take proper breaks from work

The matinée test

Hindenburg widens its attack on Adani

It has taken aim at the boss of India’s securities regulator

Can Chipotle’s boss turn Starbucks around?

Brian Niccol faces three big challenges