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The Strategic Decisions That Caused Nokia’s Failure

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In less than a decade, Nokia emerged from Finland to lead the mobile phone revolution. It rapidly grew to have one of the most recognisable and valuable brands in the world. At its height Nokia commanded a global market share in mobile phones of over 40 percent. While its journey to the top was swift, its decline was equally so, culminating in the sale of its mobile phone business to Microsoft in 2013.

It is tempting to lay the blame for Nokia’s demise at the doors of Apple, Google and Samsung. But as I argue in my latest book, “ Ringtone: Exploring the Rise and Fall of Nokia in Mobile Phones ” , this ignores one very important fact: Nokia had begun to collapse from within well before any of these companies entered the mobile communications market. In these times of technological advancement, rapid market change and growing complexity, analysing the story of Nokia provides salutary lessons for any company wanting to either forge or maintain a leading position in their industry.

Early success

With a young, united and energetic leadership team at the helm, Nokia’s early success was primarily the result of visionary and courageous management choices that leveraged the firm’s innovative technologies as digitalisation and deregulation of telecom networks quickly spread across Europe. But in the mid-1990s, the near collapse of its supply chain meant Nokia was on the precipice of being a victim of its success. In response, disciplined systems and processes were put in place, which enabled Nokia to become extremely efficient and further scale up production and sales much faster than its competitors.

Between 1996 and 2000, the headcount at Nokia Mobile Phones (NMP) increased 150 percent to 27,353, while revenues over the period were up 503 percent. This rapid growth came at a cost. And that cost was that managers at Nokia’s main development centres found themselves under ever increasing short-term performance pressure and were unable to dedicate time and resources to innovation.

While the core business focused on incremental improvements, Nokia’s relatively small data group took up the innovation mantle. In 1996, it launched the world’s first smartphone, the Communicator, and was also responsible for Nokia’s first camera phone in 2001 and its second-generation smartphone, the innovative 7650.

The search for an elusive third leg

Nokia’s leaders were aware of the importance of finding what they called a “third leg” – a new growth area to complement the hugely successful mobile phone and network businesses. Their efforts began in 1995 with the New Venture Board but this failed to gain traction as the core businesses ran their own venturing activities and executives were too absorbed with managing growth in existing areas to focus on finding new growth.

A renewed effort to find the third leg was launched with the Nokia Ventures Organisation (NVO) under the leadership of one of Nokia’s top management team. This visionary programme absorbed all existing ventures and sought out new technologies. It was successful in the sense that it nurtured a number of critical projects which were transferred to the core businesses. In fact, many opportunities NVO identified were too far ahead of their time; for instance, NVO correctly identified “the internet of things” and found opportunities in multimedia health management – a current growth area. But it ultimately failed due to an inherent contradiction between the long-term nature of its activities and the short-term performance requirements imposed on it.

Reorganising for agility

Although Nokia’s results were strong, the share price high and customers around the world satisfied and loyal, Nokia’s CEO Jorma Ollila was increasingly concerned that rapid growth had brought about a loss of agility and entrepreneurialism. Between 2001 and 2005, a number of decisions were made to attempt to rekindle Nokia’s earlier drive and energy but, far from reinvigorating Nokia, they actually set up the beginning of the decline.

Key amongst these decisions was the reallocation of important leadership roles and the poorly implemented 2004 reorganisation into a matrix structure. This led to the departure of vital members of the executive team, which led to the deterioration of strategic thinking.

Tensions within matrix organisations are common as different groups with different priorities and performance criteria are required to work collaboratively. At Nokia,which had been acccustomed to decentralised initiatives, this new way of working proved an anathema. Mid-level executives had neither the experience nor training in the subtle integrative negotiations fundamental in a successful matrix.

As I explain in my book, process trumps structure in reorganisations . And so reorganisations will be ineffective without paying attention to resource allocation processes, product policy and product management, sales priorities and providing the right incentives for well-prepared managers to support these processes. Unfortunately, this did not happen at Nokia.

NMP became locked into an increasingly conflicted product development matrix between product line executives with P&L responsibility and common “horizontal resource platforms” whose managers were struggling to allocate scarce resources. They had to meet the various and growing demands of increasingly numerous and disparate product development programmes without sufficient software architecture development and software project management skills. This conflictual way of working slowed decision-making and seriously dented morale, while the wear and tear of extraordinary growth combined with an abrasive CEO personality also began to take their toll. Many managers left.

Beyond 2004, top management was no longer sufficiently technologically savvy or strategically integrative to set priorities and resolve conflicts arising in the new matrix. Increased cost reduction pressures rendered Nokia’s strategy of product differentiation through market segmentation ineffective and resulted in a proliferation of poorer quality products.

The swift decline

The following years marked a period of infighting and strategic stasis that successive reorganisations did nothing to alleviate. By this stage, Nokia was trapped by a reliance on its unwieldy operating system called Symbian. While Symbian had given Nokia an early advantage, it was a device-centric system in what was becoming a platform- and application-centric world. To make matters worse, Symbian exacerbated delays in new phone launches as whole new sets of code had to be developed and tested for each phone model. By 2009, Nokia was using 57 different and incompatible versions of its operating system.

While Nokia posted some of its best financial results in the late 2000s, the management team was struggling to find a response to a changing environment: Software was taking precedence over hardware as the critical competitive feature in the industry. At the same time, the importance of application ecosystems was becoming apparent, but as dominant industry leader Nokia lacked the skills, and inclination to engage with this new way of working.

By 2010, the limitations of Symbian had become painfully obvious and it was clear Nokia had missed the shift toward apps pioneered by Apple. Not only did Nokia’s strategic options seem limited, but none were particularly attractive. In the mobile phone market, Nokia had become a sitting duck to growing competitive forces and accelerating market changes. The game was lost, and it was left to a new CEO Stephen Elop and new Chairman Risto Siilasmaa to draw from the lessons and successfully disengage Nokia from mobile phones to refocus the company on its other core business, network infrastructure equipment.

What can we learn from Nokia

Nokia’s decline in mobile phones cannot be explained by a single, simple answer: Management decisions, dysfunctional organisational structures, growing bureaucracy and deep internal rivalries all played a part in preventing Nokia from recognising the shift from product-based competition to one based on platforms.

Nokia’s mobile phone story exemplifies a common trait we see in mature, successful companies: Success breeds conservatism and hubris which, over time, results in a decline of the strategy processes leading to poor strategic decisions. Where once companies embraced new ideas and experimentation to spur growth, with success they become risk averse and less innovative. Such considerations will be crucial for companies that want to grow and avoid one of the biggest disruptive threats to their future – their own success.

About the author(s)

Yves L. Doz

is an Emeritus Professor of Strategic Management and the Solvay Chaired Professor of Technological Innovation, Emeritus at INSEAD.

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Rahul Tripathi

30/03/2024, 03.42 pm

I found this article on the strategic decisions behind Nokia's failure incredibly insightful! 📉 As someone interested in business strategy and management, understanding the factors that led to Nokia's downfall provides valuable lessons for avoiding similar pitfalls in the future. 💡 The analysis of Nokia's missteps, from failing to adapt to changing market trends to underestimating the competition, highlights the importance of agility and innovation in today's dynamic business landscape. 🔄💡

Moreover, the article offers actionable insights that can be applied to various industries, making it a must-read for anyone involved in strategic decision-making processes. 🌟 Thank you for sharing such informative content! I'll definitely keep these lessons in mind as I navigate my own business endeavors. 👍📚

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Anonymous User

16/03/2022, 10.44 am

Nokia is the one of the oldest phone and also it is existed until now

17/09/2021, 07.41 pm

Why does Nokia fail

26/06/2021, 09.54 pm

Someone really should dig into the tale of Nokia Music, that of OD2, a successful independent company bought by Nokia in 2007. In less than four years through marketing bodges, strategic failures, interference from gormless management in the USA, and even more nepotistic and mostly incompetent management in the UK, a profitable company with numerous high profile corporate customers was brought to its knees by talent free people who should never have been promoted into the positions they were in. Well worth digging into, just don't interview the management or you will never get to the truth.

03/06/2021, 01.56 am

As I read through many of these comments, the word "dillusional" kept coming to mind. For starters, Windows OS was as good as either Android or iOS. The main thing lacking were just a few more core apps. That was really it.

Sure, they could easily have run Andoid, and as soon as that idea was floated, Microft instantly shuttered their offices.

The fact that Nadella had his trojan horse Elop do the deal on Friday and hand everyone their walking papers on Monday is proof positive that Microsoft never had any good intentions for Nokia.

MS could have easily thrown one of their legions of Devs onto the task of writing apps. which would have solved the app. store issue in a hurry.

Instead, Nadella destroyed Microfts own eco-system by loosing that lucrative and Crucial market sector. A permanent wound that still haunts them to this day, and showcased Nadella as being far Inferior to Ballmer as well as Gates.

While my first inclination is to assume some nefarious reason for this, I do have to acknowledge however the old addage: "Don't attribute to maclice, what can easily be explained by stupidity"

30/10/2020, 04.23 pm

Why only Nokia there are a number of business world wide which have failed because of its own Founders/CEO/COO lapses some of the reasons which I contribute are as follows.... 1. Lack of vision future 2. Innovation in new age computing revolution 3. High Salary package 4. Founders cannot be pushed out or replaced easily. 5. Management Decisions 6. Dysfunctional Hierarchy 7. Growing Bureaucracy 8. Internal rivalry

21/01/2018, 12.17 am

Captain of the ship knows how to sink the boat. Stephen (the first non Finnish CEO in history of Nokia) joined in 2010 from Microsoft and made a deal to use Windows only despite the fact that Android was growing and already captured huge market share. There was a lot of pressure from Nokia employees to move to Android but he ignored all. He fired a lot of people. It was famous in Nokia Espo office (H/Q) that he is a Trojan Horse. He later sold Nokia mobile business to Microsoft and earned millions of dollars in the deal. Later, he joined Microsoft again. Looks like the plan was to promote Windows Mobile at the cost of Nokia (that failed badly)

Sheila Yovita

13/01/2018, 04.20 am

If the company is at crises, what should the managers do? Could it be one of the option go for advices from top management consulting firms or any other third parties that can help to formulate better strategies to save the company? Assuming they went for consulting firms, then the firms were failed to help Nokia as well?

22/12/2017, 02.34 am

I would love to also see something similar about Blackberry. They were the prime brand for many early adopters and business users of cellular phones here in the USA. Similar to Nokia they also had/have secure network platform. I wonder if their demise was also due to strategic mistakes, and if similar to Nokia they also got bogged down with tactical activities and lost sight of overall strategy.

21/12/2017, 05.00 am

I agree with everyone, broadly. Nonetheless we should NEVER FORGET that Nokia would be far far better (as a Smartphone maker), than it is today.

Another illustration of a North American Corporation that did so well from its foundational years in the 19th Century and well into its first centenary is NORTEL Networks... I read a book about the rise, growth and maturity of NORTEL and it became one great role model for me... Unfortunately, NORTEL failed to go the length any longer than the beginning of the 21st Century; NORTEL collapsed for reasons that are too embarrassing to speak openly abbout - or even in privacy!

I'm working on to establish a Corporate and Product Branding Consultancy in town (Accra, Ghana), and this article on Nokia, like others, is what I've been looking out for, to help learn and know how to start and grow an enterprise and keep it growing and succeeding decade after decade, century after century!

I'm learning!

17/12/2017, 07.59 pm

"While Symbian had given Nokia an early advantage, it was a device-centric system in what was becoming a platform- and application-centric world." Well, actually Nokia pioneered the app-centric world. Go check. Only it's User Interface didn't keep up with the emerging competition.

07/12/2017, 05.51 am

Nokia is still alive... and much more than a mobile phone manufacturer. Nokia is the biggest network equipment maker in the world, employees +100k people and ~25 billion € in revenue in 2016...

30/11/2017, 05.40 pm

Good article. Thanks.

Interesting side note: While working in Japan around 2002, I heard "on the street" that Nokia ran a research center in Japan. Intended to tap the vast and growing Japanese mobile market. They saw everything that was coming in the Western world. Good cameras. Apps. Cost effective mobile internet & services. Mobile email messaging on a mass scale. Multi media devices. Long before the iPhone was invented. Nokia deemed the Japanese market too challenging and closed their research center. Turned a blind eye. The competition was already too far ahead.

28/11/2017, 03.21 am

Another consideration is that Nokia stayed committed to hardware-based human-computer factors as differentiation far longer than it should have: optical strip for scrolling, buttons for menus, buttons for navigation, etc. What the iPhone showed is that software-based UX was the more flexible and powerful approach.

26/11/2017, 04.40 pm

Just imagine, if Nokia had seen the future and adopted Android operating systems before 2009-10, perhaps the horizons of the mobile Eco system would have been very different today. Similarly, Blackberry also failed to see the shift in the mobile market from a communicating device to a multi Media device. Phones transcended the mere communication and functional level to take control of our social lives and presence. The social sites and e commerce growth were trends and changes that both these behemoths failed to see or gauge. They still remain extremely hardware centred, building very physically robust devices but perhaps falling short on the imagination part. I think this is entirely a matter of leadership vision and imagination.

25/11/2017, 12.00 am

Unless I am misremembering, I am sure I had a Samsung phone in the early 2000s. It was nothing like the Samsung mobiles of today. It was not user friendly, the operating system was a mess and I soon went back to Nokia but it's not true to say that Samsung hadn't entered the mobile communications market, they just hadn't entered the smart phone market. (Not that I don't agree with the thrust of the article - Nokia's downfall was very much of its own making).

24/11/2017, 11.53 pm

I think a similar story can be told about Microsoft under Ballmer. What Symbian was for Nokia, Windows was for Microsoft at one time. Nadella came in just at the right time to lift the company out of that slumber and made it take a leap of faith in the Cloud world. The results are evident. Microsoft is sailing at its lifetime best share prices. On the contrary, when we look at Apple, they seem to be following the footsteps of Nokia. Slowly but surely they are becoming a victim of their own success.

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The rise and fall of nokia

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Sales plan presentation for N8. Product History Over the past 150 years, Nokia has evolved from a riverside paper mill in south-western Finland to a global.

Finland and Nokia: Creating the World’s Most Competitive Economy

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Melisa Anderson Alex Amber Vivian.  Based in Finland  Employ nearly 130,000 people in 120 countries  38% of market share in 3 rd quarter of 2009 

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Redhawks Consulting Nokia Denmark “Empower[ing] everyone to share and make the most of their life by offering irresistible personal choices.” - Nokia Corporation.

Student Name: Group.  Developed by Microsoft  Alliance with Nokia in 2011  4 main functions:  Outlook Mobile  Windows Media Player for Windows Mobile.

Basic principles in product engineering Professor Y. C. Chan Chair Professor of Electronic Engineering Engineers in Society ( EE3014 ) Lecture Series.

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The Real Cause of Nokia’s Crisis

• Michael Schrage

Nokia’s technology isn’t a root cause of its current crisis. Don’t blame its engineers and designers either. The company still knows how to innovate. There’s a simpler and more strategic explanation for why this once-perennial market leader became second-rate. Nokia ignored America. The company simply refused to compete energetically, ingeniously and respectfully in the U.S. […]

Nokia’s technology isn’t a root cause of its current crisis. Don’t blame its engineers and designers either. The company still knows how to innovate . There’s a simpler and more strategic explanation for why this once-perennial market leader became second-rate.

• MS Michael Schrage , a research fellow at MIT Sloan School’s Center for Digital Business, is the author of the books Serious Play (HBR Press), Who Do You Want Your Customers to Become? (HBR Press) and The Innovator’s Hypothesis (MIT Press).

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Case Study 4: The Collapse of Nokia’s Mobile Phone Business

• First Online: 30 July 2018

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• Tuomo Peltonen 2  

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This chapter provides a wisdom-oriented reading of one of the most spectacular business failures of recent times: the collapse of Nokia mobile phones between 2007 and 2015. Using executive biographies and other published accounts of Nokia’s organisational patterns, the chapter attempts to offer a more balanced explanation of the processes behind Nokia’s inability to respond to the changing industry circumstances. The following analysis pays attention to the shaping of Nokia’s organisational culture. Company and its new leadership adopted a professional, no-nonsense approach in the aftermath of the problems of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The new generation of managers believed in a rational mindset supported by a bureaucratic organisational form. Leaning on a superior technological competence within the mobile phone sector, Nokia was capable of ultimately becoming the market leader. However, in 2007, with two major players, Apple and Google, joining the business, the established rules of competitive dynamics were irrevocably changed. Focus shifted to software and applications. Nokia’s risk-aversive and closed organisational culture could not respond in a situation where an open search for new innovations and a cooperative internal working mode were needed. An analysis of the development of Nokia’s organisational psyche following the emergence of a new generation of managers and executives highlights the role of local beliefs in using philosophical wisdom in critical circumstances. Nokia and its leadership were not able to abandon the outmoded habits and structures, as these had become integrated with the very identity of the company.

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Peltonen, T. (2019). Case Study 4: The Collapse of Nokia’s Mobile Phone Business. In: Towards Wise Management. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91719-1_6

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The Rise and Fall of Nokia

By julian birkinshaw , lisa duke.

The case describes Nokia’s spectacular rise and fall, shedding light on the combination of external factors and internal decisions that resulted in the company’s handset business being sold to Microsoft in 2010.During the successful period of growth (roughly 1990 through to 2006), Nokia’s focus on design and functionality gained it a worldwide reputation. It was acknowledged as the first smartphone manufacturer. Through the early-mid 2000s it was the undisputed leader in the global mobile phone business. The case traces the first signs of trouble and the company’s subsequent decline over the period 2005 to 2010. Pressure in the early 2000s from low-end competitors led to early signs of problems. Then of course the game changed in 2007 with Apple’s iPhone and a year later with phones powered by Google’s Android operating system from HTC, Samsung and others. Nokia was initially dismissive of these new offerings but its proprietary OS, Symbian, was ageing badly and its App store (Ovi) was no match for Apple’s. In September 2010 it was announced that American Stephen Elop, formerly of Microsoft, would become CEO. Not long afterwards a partnership with Microsoft was signed which subsequently led to Nokia’s handset business being sold to Microsoft.

Learning objectives

• Understand why good companies go bad; in other words, see how the assets that enable companies to succeed can also be liabilities when the market turns against them.
• Provide insight into the nature of disruption in an established industry and why incumbent firms struggle to adapt.
• Examine the different paths companies should take to respond to disruptive forces.
• Understand the leadership challenge for executives when their performance starts to decline2. To understand the dynamics of change in a fast-changing industry.
• Identify strategies companies can use to adapt quickly to disruptive changes.

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The rise and fall of Nokia - lessons from failure

Updated: May 8, 2023

One of the pivotal moments in life as we know it today was the emergence of cellular phones. The emergence of this sector gave rise to a plethora of brands, such as Apple, Redmi, Samsung, and the brand that was leading them all - Nokia. But sadly, what was a behemoth then is now just a footnote.

The once iconic cell phone that we saw in the hands of almost every adult, also named the Best selling Mobile Phone Brand in the world (October 1998), is now rarely even spoken about. So what went wrong? What resulted in Nokia’s downfall? Let’s explore the Nokia case study and find out what factors caused its tragic “from success to failure” story.

The following are the major factors that accounted for Nokia’s downfall:

Resistance to the only constant- Change: With the rapid pace of change, especially in technology, Nokia’s resistance didn’t help their brand. It kept producing older versions of its phones as compared to its competitors, who kept upgrading their phones. As a result, their market shifted to these newer, more affordable ones.

No strategic plan: Nokia’s rivals, such as Apple and Samsung, had a successful marketing strategy that kept their customers and potential ones interested and on the lookout for their new products. They both used the umbrella branding strategy (such as Samsung with their Galaxy series) that kept users hooked. Seeing this, Nokia tried to release its own line of hardware and software, but it already existed in the market because of its competitors.

Innovation: As the demand for their phones increased, Nokia focused most of its resources on its manufacturing rather than its innovation. Even with the release of their Nokia Lumia phone, they provided the most basic features with the dullest visuals compared to their competitors.

Overestimated strength: Nokia’s management believed that their market would wait for them and buy their phones regardless of what they produced and hence, didn’t focus much on what their competitors put out. They got stuck with outdated hardware and buggy software which resulted in Nokia’s downfall.

Check out these links to know more about the rise and fall of Nokia:

https://www.doersempire.com/why-nokia-failed/#:~:text=Initially%2C%20the%20new%20technology%2C%20urge,company%20on%20the%20strategic%20level -The history, fall and what we can learn from it.

https://www.feedough.com/why-did-nokia-fail/ -The rise, timeline of Nokia’s failure and its reasons.

https://startuptalky.com/reasons-why-nokia-failed/ -Reasons for Nokia’s failure and FAQs.

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Related Papers

Raluca Leustean

Microsoft will take over Nokia's Devices and Services business, which includes both Smart Devices and Mobile Devices. In other words: The Lumia, Asha and X series are now all under Microsoft's umbrella. Design teams, supply chain, accessories, employees, developer relations and most of Nokia's manufacturing plants and testing facilities are also on Microsoft's side, as are most of the company's services like MixRadio, Store and more. Here, Nokia's mapping entity, is considered a separate business and isn't included as part of the deal, but Microsoft has agreed to a 10-year licensing agreement. On the one hand, Nokia's decision to sell its mobile phone business to Microsoft is a Finnish tragedy. At Nokia's best times, this giant contributed a quarter of Finland's economic growth for past 10 years: it paid 23% of Finland's corporate taxes. On the other hand, getting out of the mobile phone business sector is a probable blessing for Nokia. Life is tough nowadays for second-tier smartphone companies. Nokia's global market share in the mobile phone market has dropped to 14 percent (from 19.9 percent a year ago, according to Gartner). The revenue of the company brings in from its devices and services division is down by more than half since 2008.This paper is aimed to show why Nokia had to be saved by someone external, both from the technological and financial point of view.

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Nokia was a synonym for the mobile phone industry for a long time; however, when it came into the era of smart phones, the former leader was under an awkward situation. Nokia sold its mobile phone business to Microsoft on September 3, 2013. A company following Kodak with the legendary color failed in the impact of the new technology revolution. This was a typical case of the subversion of an industry; therefore, the author believed that it was necessary to analyze the process. This paper studied Nokia's decline mainly from the three parts. First of all, looking back Nokia's development process from the glory to the decline, it can be divided into three stages: the transition period, the peak period and the decline period, followed by analyzing the reasons of its decline from three parts: Nokia executives' grasp for the market, the company's business strategy and business cooperation, and finally analyzing its inspiration for modern enterprises from the marketing perspective.

Business History

International Journal of Business Ecosystem & Strategy (2687-2293)

The aim of the paper to investigates the reason for business failure using Nokia as a case study. The paper applies the explanatory conclusive research design since there are cause and effect relations that seek to provide a better understanding of the reasons for the market failure. The mobile manufacturing sector is the most interesting and innovative of all in the “Information & Communications Technology” sector (ICT). Nokia was once known as the market’s dominant company, leader, and pacesetter until it underwent a tremendous market failure. The aim of this research is to shed light on Nokia’s failure in the market due to its complacency & fear of change, lack of innovation moving too slowly in terms of being too late in making decisions & inventing of the iPhone. Paper elaborately discusses and analyses the failure reasons supported by a literature review in addition to the characteristics of this industry and its market structure. Finally provide advice for business makers

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Nokia: The Inside Story of the Rise and Fall of a Technology Giant

The case examines the downward spiral of Nokia, the mobile technology giant that once conquered the world, seen from the perspective of ‘insiders’ – based on interviews with Nokia executives at top and middle management level. They describe the emotional undercurrents of the innovation process that caused temporal myopia – an excessive focus on short-term innovation at the expense of longer-term more beneficial activities. Nokia’s once-stellar performance was undermined by misaligned collective fear: top managers were afraid of competition from rival products, while middle managers were afraid of their bosses and even their peers. It was their reluctance to share negative information with top managers – who thus remained overly optimistic about the organisation’s capabilities – that generated inaccurate feedback and poorly adapted organizational responses that led to the company’s downfall. The case covers the period from the early 2000s to 2010, with a focus on 2007 (the introduction of the iPhone) to 2010, when the CEO left. Read a related Knowledge article "Who Killed Nokia? Nokia Did" by Quy Huy.

After reading and analysing the case, students will understand (i) how emotional dynamics influence hard technological and strategic decisions in organizations as they translate into challenges for innovation, (ii) how emotional dynamics can undermine innovation and performance.

• Top and middle management
• Mobile phone
• Radical change
• Strategic agility
• Temporal myopia

Quy Huy

Timo o. vuori.

Lisa Simone Duke

Recommended cases.

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9 Reasons Why Nokia Failed After Enjoying Unrivaled Dominance

Devashish Shrivastava , Akshat Hawelia

In the annals of mobile phone history, Nokia once reigned supreme with its robust devices and iconic brand. However, as the smartphone revolution took hold, Nokia's fortunes took a sharp turn, leading to a notable decline in its market share and influence. The fall of such a prominent industry leader begs the question: What were the reasons behind Nokia's failure?

This post focuses on the reasons why Nokia failed after enjoying unrivaled dominance in the mobile segment for several years. The ferocious and mighty telecom giant Nokia was well known for its products' hardware and battery life. By understanding the lessons from Nokia's journey, we can gain valuable insights into the rapidly evolving landscape of the technology industry and the critical importance of adaptation and innovation.

For years, it was the talk of the town. User satisfaction with Nokia’s mobiles was globally recognized. The company launched the first internet-enabled phone in 1996, and by the start of the millennium, Nokia had also released a touch-screen mobile prototype.

This was the start of a revolution in the mobile phone industry. The Finnish giant was the largest cell phone maker in 1998. Nokia overtook Motorola, a move that was hard to predict. So, what led to the downfall of Nokia? It wasn’t a single factor but a myriad of reasons, most of which resulted from Nokia's resistance to change. We present to you the six main reasons behind Nokia's failure.

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Reasons for Nokia Failure: Case Study

The resistance to smartphone evolution, the deal with microsoft, nokia's failed marketing strategies, moving too slow with the industry, overestimation of strength, lack of innovation in products, organizational restructuring at nokia, the symbian vs. meego os dilemma at nokia, failure to adapt and reposition.

In the fast-paced world of technology, companies that fail to adapt to changing trends and consumer demands can quickly find themselves left behind. Nokia, once synonymous with mobile phone supremacy, experienced a significant downfall due to its resistance to smartphone evolution. As competitors embraced the shift towards smartphones, Nokia's reluctance to fully embrace this revolution became one of the key reasons for its failure.

Nokia failed to take advantage of the Android bandwagon. When mobile phone manufacturers were busy improving and working on their smartphones, Nokia remained stubborn. Samsung soon launched its Android-based range of phones that were cost-effective and user-friendly.

Nokia's management was under the impression that people wouldn’t accept touchscreen phones and would continue with the QWERTY keypad layout. This misapprehension was the start of its downfall. Nokia never considered Android as an advancement and neither wanted to adopt the Android operating system.

After realizing the market trends, Nokia introduced its Symbian operating system, which was used in its smartphones. It faced usability issues and lacked the app support and developer ecosystem that rival platforms like iOS and Android offered. The clunky user experience and limited app selection hampered Nokia's ability to compete effectively. Also, it was too late by then, with Apple and Samsung having cemented their positions. It was difficult for the Symbian operating system to make any inroads. This is the biggest reason behind Nokia's downfall.

Nokia was slow to recognize the potential of smartphones and the shift from feature phones to touchscreen devices. They failed to anticipate the demand for devices with advanced capabilities, such as app ecosystems and touch interfaces. This led to a loss of market share to competitors like Apple's iPhone and Android-based smartphones.

Another reason for Nokia's failure was the ill-timed deal with the tech giant Microsoft . The company sold itself to Microsoft at a time when the software behemoth was fraught with losses.

Nokia's sales screamed the mobile phone maker's inability to survive on its own. At the same time, Apple and Samsung were making significant strides in innovation and technological developments.

It was too late for Nokia to adapt to the dynamic and rigorous changes in the market. Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia is considered to be one of the biggest blunders and wasn't fruitful for either side.

The partnership limited Nokia's ability to differentiate itself and left it dependent on Microsoft's success in the mobile industry . The Windows Phone platform struggled to gain traction, further impacting Nokia's market position. This case study provides valuable lessons for businesses considering similar alliances and emphasizes the importance of aligning visions, complementary strengths, and adaptable strategies.

Marketing plays a crucial role in shaping a brand's success and perception. In the case of Nokia, its decline can be attributed, in part, to failed marketing strategies that hindered its ability to compete effectively in the mobile phone market.

One notable misstep in Nokia's marketing approach was its unsuccessful implementation of umbrella branding . Companies like Apple and Samsung successfully adopted the umbrella branding model, with flagship products like the iPhone and Samsung Galaxy series acting as the focal point for expanding their product lines. However, Nokia failed to follow suit and capitalize on the umbrella branding strategy, missing out on the opportunity to create a cohesive and recognizable brand identity.

Additionally, Nokia's marketing efforts struggled to maintain the user trust that the company had built over the years. Inefficient selling and distribution methods further eroded consumer confidence and made it difficult for Nokia to reach its target audience effectively.

While Nokia attempted to regain momentum by introducing hardware and software innovations, these offerings were often late to the market and lacked the uniqueness that would have set them apart from competitors. Rivals had already released similar features and devices, diminishing Nokia's ability to capture consumers' attention and regain market share.

The failure of Nokia's marketing and distribution strategies played a significant role in its ultimate decline and exit from the mobile industry market. Without a strong brand identity, effective distribution channels, and timely innovations, Nokia struggled to compete with rivals who had successfully aligned their marketing strategies with evolving consumer preferences and market dynamics.

Nokia's failure to keep pace with changing technology and trends played a significant role in its decline. While the company had earned a reputation for its hardware, it didn't prioritize its software lineup, which proved to be a crucial oversight.

Initially, Nokia was cautious about embracing technical advancements in order to mitigate the risks associated with introducing innovative features to its phones. However, this approach hindered the company's ability to adapt to the rapidly evolving market.

The business needed diversification, but it was too late by the time Nokia realized this. Instead of being amongst the early initiators, Nokia transitioned when almost every major brand had already started producing awesome phones.

This case study shows Nokia's failure to keep up with changing technology and its delayed response to industry trends significantly contributed to its downfall.

Nokia overestimated its brand value. The company believed that even after the late launch of its smartphones, people would still flock to stores and purchase Nokia-manufactured phones. This turned out to be a misconception, as consumer preferences had shifted towards other brands.

People still make predictions that Nokia will retain the market leadership if it uses better software at its core. However, this is far from the truth, as seen today.

The company got stuck with its software system, which is known to have several bugs and clunks. Nokia felt its previous glory would help alleviate any sort of trouble. Unfortunately, things didn’t play out that way.

Unfortunately, the market dynamics had changed, and consumers were no longer willing to overlook the shortcomings of Nokia's software. Competitors had surpassed Nokia in terms of user experience and software innovation, leaving Nokia struggling to regain its position.

Nokia's lack of innovation in its products significantly contributed to its failure case study. While brands like Samsung and Apple came up with advanced phones every year, Nokia simply launched the Windows phone with basic features, failing to keep up with the industry's rapid progress..

The Nokia Lumia series was a jump-start measure, but even that collapsed due to a lack of innovation. The unattractive and dull features didn’t help. In the era of 4G, Nokia didn’t even have 3G-enabled phones. Nokia also came up with the Asha series, but it was game over by then.

Wrong decisions and risk aversion brought about the decline of the mobile giant. Nokia refrained from adopting the latest tech. Nokia's failure became a powerful case study that made organizations realize the importance of continuous evolution and enhancements. The journey of what was once the world’s best mobile phone company to losing it all by 2013 is quite tragic. Nokia's failure was not solely due to its lack of innovation but also its shortcomings in leadership and guidance. These factors, combined with its inability to adapt to market demands and technological advancements, sealed the company's fate.

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Nokia underwent a sudden and significant organizational shift by adopting a matrix structure driven by enhancing agility within the company. However, this abrupt change resulted in dissatisfaction among stakeholders, particularly as key individuals in top management departed from the organization. These individuals, who had played instrumental roles in establishing Nokia as a leading company, were no longer part of the decision-making process .

The shift to a matrix structure also brought about internal challenges, as stability in top management, a crucial element for organizational coherence, was disrupted. Over just five years, Nokia experienced two CEO replacements , preventing employees from fully adapting to new leadership goals and visions. The frequent changes in leadership created instability and hindered consistent strategic direction. The lack of continuity in leadership contributed to employee dissatisfaction and impacted the overall cohesiveness of the organization. Employees and other stakeholders found it challenging to align with successive CEOs, leading to a breakdown in communication and a sense of disconnect within the company.

Nokia Changes their Logo After 60 Years

Nokia's problem arose when its R&D division underwent a split, with one faction dedicated to enhancing the Symbian operating system and the other focused on developing MeeGo. The competing claims of superiority between the two teams led to internal friction, causing delays in the release of new phones. The company grappled with the challenge of harmonizing divergent technological directions, impacting its ability to bring innovative products to market in a timely manner. This internal competition within the R&D division created a complex dynamic, hindering Nokia's efficiency and potentially affecting its competitive edge in the rapidly evolving smartphone market.

Nokia's downfall can be attributed to its failure to analyze market trends and adjust its strategy accordingly. The company neglected the burgeoning smartphone market, ultimately missing a significant opportunity for growth. Rather than capitalizing on this evolving landscape, Nokia could have revitalized its position by enhancing its existing software, such as Symbian. Unfortunately, the lack of strategic foresight and adaptability led to a missed chance to stay competitive in the dynamic tech industry.

Moreover, the oversight in market analysis and strategic planning eroded Nokia's market share and diminished its relevance in the rapidly changing consumer electronics landscape. The company's reluctance to pivot and innovate in response to market dynamics ultimately contributed to its decline in the face of evolving consumer preferences and technological advancements.

The fall of Nokia can be attributed to a combination of factors that hindered its ability to adapt, innovate, and stay competitive in the mobile phone market. The resistance to smartphone evolution, missed opportunities, ineffective marketing strategies, and the deal with Microsoft all contributed to its downfall. Ultimately, Nokia's decline serves as a reminder of the importance of staying agile, embracing change, and continuously evolving to meet consumer demands.

Why did Nokia fail?

Not switching to Android, lack of innovation, not upgrading the software, and overestimating the brand value were some of the reasons that led to Nokia's failure.

What is Nokia?

Nokia is a consumer electronics company popular for its mobile phones. It is one of the largest mobile phone manufacturers in the world.

Is the Nokia company closed?

No, the company is still running, but it has shut down some of its plants.

What happened to Nokia?

Once a dominant force, Nokia clung to outdated software, allowing Android and iOS to surge ahead, leaving the brand lagging. Despite its focus on new technologies, Nokia's legacy now lives on in the realm of Android.

Why did Nokia fail to compete with Samsung and Apple?

Nokia didn't adopt Android and focused on its hardware more than its software, which is why it failed to compete against Samsung and Apple.

Are there any new Nokia smartphones coming in the near future?

Though Nokia might seem dominant on the phone front, the company occasionally comes up with some new phones/smartphone devices. Here are some of the Nokia smartphones that are likely to be launched in 2022:

• Nokia 2760 Flip 4G
• Nokia C21 Plus
• Nokia Suzume
• Nokia C2 2nd Edition

Who took over Nokia?

Nokia phones were robust and dependable companions of the pre-smartphone era. However, Nokia's Java and Windows phones failed to stand out in the market dominated by Apple and Android phones. The Android phone manufacturing companies like Samsung, LG, HTC, Sony, Motorola, and other Chinese smartphone developers like MI, Realme, Oppo, Vivo, and the Apple IOS devices took over Nokia in the mobile sector.

What lessons can other businesses learn from Nokia's failure?

Nokia's failure highlights the importance of embracing change, anticipating market trends, and continuously innovating to meet customer expectations. It underscores the need for effective marketing strategies, strategic partnerships, and an unwavering commitment to adaptation and innovation in today's rapidly evolving business landscape.

Was Nokia's lack of innovation a significant factor in its decline?

Yes, Nokia's lack of innovation in its product lineup played a significant role in its downfall. The company failed to keep pace with rivals who consistently introduced advanced devices and embraced evolving market demands, which resulted in Nokia losing its competitive edge.

Why did Nokia go out of business?

Nokia lost its phone industry dominance by sticking to outdated software, missing the smartphone revolution, and experiencing a significant sell-off. Despite not going out of business, Nokia's cautionary tale highlights the vital role of innovation in a rapidly evolving tech landscape, with the company still present in network tech and patents.

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Case report

• Open access
• Published: 05 August 2024

Improving oxygenation in a patient with respiratory failure due to morbid obesity by applying airway pressure release ventilation: a case report

• Ryosuke Nobe   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1790-2740 1 ,
• Kenichiro Ishida 1 ,
• Yuki Togami 1 ,
• Masahiro Ojima 1 ,
• Taku Sogabe 1 &
• Mitsuo Ohnishi 1  

Journal of Medical Case Reports volume  18 , Article number:  353 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

89 Accesses

Metrics details

Introduction

Morbidly obese patients occasionally have respiratory problems owing to hypoventilation. Airway pressure release ventilation is one of the ventilation settings often used for respiratory management of acute respiratory distress syndrome. However, previous reports indicating that airway pressure release ventilation may become a therapeutic measure as ventilator management in morbid obesity with respiratory failure is limited. We report a case of markedly improved oxygenation in a morbidly obese patient after airway pressure release ventilation application.

A 50s-year-old Asian man (body mass index 41 kg/m 2 ) presented with breathing difficulties. The patient had respiratory failure with a PaO 2 /F I O 2 ratio of approximately 100 and severe atelectasis in the left lung, and ventilator management was initiated. Although the patient was managed on a conventional ventilate mode, oxygenation did not improve. On day 11, we changed the ventilation setting to airway pressure release ventilation, which showed marked improvement in oxygenation with a PaO 2 /F I O 2 ratio of approximately 300. We could reduce sedative medication and apply respiratory rehabilitation. The patient was weaned from the ventilator on day 29 and transferred to another hospital for further rehabilitation on day 31.

Airway pressure release ventilation ventilator management in morbidly obese patients may contribute to improving oxygenation and become one of the direct therapeutic measures in the early stage of critical care.

Peer Review reports

Morbidly obese patients are often prone to respiratory compromise owing to the weight of the anterior chest wall and compression on the diaphragm from increased intra-abdominal pressure [ 1 , 2 ]. Airway pressure release ventilation (APRV) is one of the mechanical ventilation settings that can improve oxygenation by recruiting collapsed lung [ 3 , 4 ], which is occasionally used for respiratory management of acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) [ 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ]. However, universally accepted indications of APRV, especially for cases of respiratory failure owing to morbid obesity, are unclear. Previous reports are limited in suggesting APRV may have become a direct treatment for hypoventilation syndrome caused by morbid obesity [ 8 , 9 , 10 ].

We report a case of respiratory failure owing to morbid obesity, presenting with severe atelectasis, in which oxygenation markedly improved after using APRV.

This paper does not require the consent of an ethics committee. In addition, the patient has been anonymized in accordance with the Personal Information Protection Law, and consent for publication has been obtained from the patient.

Case presentation

The patient was a 50s-year-old Asian man with a height of 171 cm, weight of 120 kg, and body mass index (BMI) of 41 kg/m 2 , presenting with left diaphragmatic nerve palsy owing to trauma at the age of 18 years. Other medical history included sleep apnea syndrome, type 2 diabetes mellitus and hypertension. The patient spent much time in the dorsal position because of sleep apnea syndrome. One day, after going to work, the patient had difficulty breathing and was transported to our hospital.

On hospital arrival, the patient’s vital signs were as follows: Glasgow coma scale of E4V5M6, SpO 2 of 87% (room air), respiratory rate pf 28 breaths/minute, blood pressure of 182/101 mmHg, pulse of 108/minute, and body temperature of 35.8 °C. As breathing was slightly effortful, left breathing sounds were diminished. Arterial blood gas analysis (oxygen 2 L/minute) showed a pH of 7.235, PaCO 2 of 87.5 mmHg, PaO 2 of 62.9 mmHg, and the blood test showed white blood cell (WBC) count of 7700/μL, C-reactive protein (CRP) 1.44 mg/dL, aspartate transferase (AST) 15 U/L, alanine transaminase (ALT) 15 U/L, Cr 0.69 mg/dL, Na 144 mEq/L, K 3.6 mEq/L, Hb 16.7 g/dL, albumin (Alb) 4.2 g/dL. Chest X-ray revealed loss of air in the left lung (Fig.  1 A). Plain computed tomography showed slight ground-glass areas in the upper lobe of the right lung, besides the left lung showed almost no air content, and the left diaphragm was elevated (Fig.  1 B).

A Chest X-ray findings on admission showed loss of air content in the left lung. B Coronal computed tomography findings on admission showed slight ground-glass areas in the upper lobe of the right lung. The left lung showed almost complete loss of air content and elevated left diaphragm, which is indicated by a black arrow

The patient’s respiratory condition worsened after arrival; he was diagnosed with type 2 respiratory failure owing to atelectasis and pneumonia related to morbid obesity, and was intubated and managed on a ventilator (Evita V 300; Dräger Medical AG & Co.) in the intensive care unit. The ventilator was set to pressure control ventilation (PCV) with F I O 2 of 0.8, peak inspiratory pressure of 36 cmH 2 O, inspiratory time of 0.95 seconds, positive end-expiratory pressure (PEEP) of 8 cmH 2 O, and ventilation rate of 22/minute. Although a high drive pressure of 28 cmH 2 O was initially required to maintain adequate minute volume, hypercarbia improved relatively quickly. Subsequently, inspiratory pressure was adjusted to around 30 cmH 2 O to maintain a tidal volume of 0.6–0.8 mL/kg (ideal body weight). However, hypoxia persisted with a PaO 2 /F I O 2 ratio (P/F ratio) of approximately 100 (Fig.  2 ).

PaO 2 /F I O 2 ratio and progress of ventilator settings after admission. The black line expresses PaO 2 /F I O 2 ratio, and dark and light gray areas indicate peak inspiratory and positive end-expiratory pressure, respectively

PIP, peak inspiratory pressure; P high , high pressure; PEEP, positive end-expiratory pressure; PCV, pressure control ventilation; APRV, airway pressure release ventilation; CPAP, continuous positive airway pressure

On day 2, bronchoscopy was performed to atelectasis, and chest X-ray showed that air content in the left lung improved slightly (Fig.  3 A); however, oxygenation did not improve. Tracheotomy was performed for further positional changes and respiratory rehabilitation on day 5. On day 7, chest X-ray showed that the left diaphragm had descended, and permeability of the left lung had improved. However, the right lower lobe had an enhanced shadow (Fig.  3 B), and oxygenation did not improve. On day 11, the ventilator was shifted to APRV mode (P high /P low  = 30/0 cmH 2 O, T high /T low  = 6/0.5 seconds) with the expectation of alveolar recruitment effect. This markedly improved hypoxia, with a P/F ratio of 300 approximately 3 hours after changing the setting while maintaining the tidal volume. Chest X-ray performed on day 12 revealed improved lung permeability (Fig.  3 C). After changing the ventilator setting to APRV, the patient underwent active rehabilitation under light sedation. On day 16, the ventilator setting was switched to continuous positive airway pressure mode, and the patient remained well-oxygenated and showed no carbon dioxide retention. The patient was weaned from ventilator on day 29, and the X-ray finding showed that although the diaphragm was elevated, the patient’s respiratory status did not deteriorate (Fig.  3 D). The patient was transferred to another hospital for further rehabilitation on day 31. Since admission, the patient’s weight has been controlled through rehabilitation and nutritional management, and his weight had decreased to 104 kg (BMI 36 kg/m 2 ) at discharge.

A Chest X-ray on day 2 after bronchoscopy; B Chest X-ray on day 7; C Chest X-ray on day 11; D Chest X-ray on day 29 before ventilator withdrawal

The patient had an elevated diaphragm owing to morbid obesity and left diaphragmatic nerve palsy, requiring ventilator management owing to respiratory failure; however, oxygenation improved after applying APRV. We suggest that APRV has the potential to be an effective ventilator setting for respiratory failure owing to morbid obesity.

APRV is expected to improve oxygenation by increasing ventilation of aeration-dependent lung tissue, opening nonaerated tissue, and reducing dead space in the lungs; consequently, this would improve the alveolar recruitment effect [ 11 ]. It has been used as an open-lung approach, especially in patients with early-stage ARDS, and has been reported to have various efficacies that reduce the number of ventilator management days and intensive care unit (ICU) stays and contribute to a reduction in sedative medications [ 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 12 ]. However, universal indications of APRV other than ARDS are unclear, and previous reports that APRV can be a therapeutic ventilator setting in morbidly obese patients are limited [ 8 , 9 , 10 ].

In general, morbidly obese patients tend to have decreased chest wall compliance and respiratory muscle endurance. This occurs owing to anterior chest wall loading, which increases respiratory work and airway resistance and decreases basal lung capacity owing to visceral adipose tissue accumulating in the abdominal wall and cavity. This accumulation prevents diaphragmatic movement, obstructs peripheral airways, and causes a ventilation-perfusion (V/Q) mismatch [ 1 , 2 ]. The patient was morbidly obese with diaphragmatic nerve palsy, causing the left diaphragm to move toward the thoracic cavity more easily. Furthermore, we thought that pneumonia and atelectasis resulted in respiratory failure owing to an inability to compensate for systemic oxygen demands.

The patient’s improved oxygenation could be attributed to APRV, with the initial intensive care interventions, such as multiple bronchoscopies, aggressive repositioning, and antibiotic therapy, providing foundational support. These interventions effectively addressed alveolar hypoventilation, corrected the V/Q mismatch, and resolved atelectasis.

In addition, clinical findings did not improve even though PCV mode was set to relatively high inspiratory pressure and PEEP, probably suggesting that continuous high positive pressure, such as APRV, might be effective in morbidly obese patients.

Furthermore, chest X-ray findings on the second and seventh days showed improvement in left lung atelectasis; however, oxygenation did not improve (Fig.  2 ). Although this could have been related to worsening atelectasis in the right lung, we considered the possibility of a phenomenon of similar to hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction occurring in the left lung [ 13 ]. Kozian et al . reported in an animal study examining V/Q mismatch after one-lung ventilation, in which, after 90 minutes of one-lung ventilation, the tidal volume returned to baseline values resuming both lung ventilation; on the other hand, the blood perfusion in the collapsed lung did not return to the initial baseline value after 90 minutes from restarting both lung ventilation [ 14 ]. Although it was unclear how long the nonaerated left lung continued, we postulated that the V/Q mismatch persisting after improvement in atelectasis may have prevented improvement in oxygenation. A previous report indicated APRV contributes secondarily to the redistribution of blood perfusion in the recruited area [ 11 ]; it could have contributed to correcting the continued V/Q mismatch in the left lung.

Throughout the treatment course, a series of interventions were methodically applied, each contributing incrementally to the patient’s overall respiratory improvement. These interventions included bronchoscopy, active repositioning after tracheostomy, and antibiotic therapy. Each of these steps was vital in stabilizing the patient and improving lung function.

However, a significant observable change in the patient’s oxygenation was noted after the switch from PCV to APRV, as evidenced by the sharp increase in the P/F ratio depicted in Fig.  2 . While it was crucial to recognize that the cumulative effect of all interventions likely facilitated this improvement, the extent of the change suggested a substantial role for APRV. This marked improvement indicates that APRV might be particularly effective in this morbidly obese patient.

Since we expected resolving atelectasis and pneumonia to improve oxygenation initially, we implemented other interventions, including bronchoscopy, tracheostomy, and antibiotic therapy. These approaches eventually led to delays in applying APRV, so the duration of ventilator management and length of hospital stay could have been reduced even more by the earlier switch to APRV mode.

Other approaches, such as prone position and high PEEP to improve oxygenation [ 15 ], would be considered. However, we thought prone positioning, a well-documented strategy for improving V/Q mismatch, might be associated with risks related to pressure sores, high intra-abdominal pressure and vascular access and bloodstream infection [ 15 , 16 ], so we postponed this method initially. We employed lung recruitment maneuvers and adjusted PEEP levels cautiously, balancing the need for alveolar recruitment with the risk of barotrauma and hemodynamic instability, particularly in a patient with high intra-abdominal pressure owing to obesity. The initial conservative PEEP settings were part of our strategy to avoid potential complications while assessing the patient’s response to standard ventilatory settings.

The decision to eventually implement APRV could be a relatively secure approach to respiratory failure owing to the morbidly obese patient. This mode seemed to contribute to achieving both recruitment and appropriate oxygenation without the risks associated with high PEEP settings and without the complexities of managing prone positioning in a morbidly obese patient.

After the switch to APRV mode, the patient was managed in a sitting position with light sedation, and active respiratory rehabilitation was possible. Furthermore, other multidisciplinary treatments, including weight loss by nutritional management, were considered to have prevented the recurrence of respiratory failure even after APRV mode was ended. In this sense, APRV should be viewed as a therapeutic approach for patients with morbidly obesity-related respiratory failure from an early stage in critical care.

We experienced a case in which oxygenation was markedly improved after ventilator management with APRV in a patient with morbid obesity and left diaphragmatic nerve palsy. While a multidisciplinary approach is essential for managing severe respiratory conditions in morbidly obese patients, APRV management may contribute directly to improving oxygenation in morbid obesity with respiratory failure and should be recognized as one of the therapeutic measures from the early stage of critical care.

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Abbreviations

• Airway pressure release ventilation

Acute respiratory distress syndrome

Body mass index

PaO 2 /F I O 2 ratio

Ventilation-perfusion mismatch

Pressure–control ventilation

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Acknowledgements

We thank the entire Osaka National Hospital staff for their help in treating this case and Editage ( www.editage.jp ) for English language editing.

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Ryosuke Nobe, Kenichiro Ishida, Yuki Togami, Masahiro Ojima, Taku Sogabe & Mitsuo Ohnishi

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RN drafted the manuscript; RN and YT created figures; RN, M Ojima, and KI edited and revised the manuscript; KI, TS, and M Ohnishi provided advice on the interpretation of the patient’s case. All authors critically reviewed the manuscript for its content and accuracy.

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Nobe, R., Ishida, K., Togami, Y. et al. Improving oxygenation in a patient with respiratory failure due to morbid obesity by applying airway pressure release ventilation: a case report. J Med Case Reports 18 , 353 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13256-024-04665-2

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Received : 21 August 2023

Accepted : 27 June 2024

Published : 05 August 2024

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1186/s13256-024-04665-2

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